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ABSTRACT 
This study is an examination of cross cultural philosophical discourse between 
North American Indigenous cultures and the dominant Western culture. The 
methodological approaches used in this study are modeled after the work of Michael M. 
Pomedli, Thomas W. Overholt and J. Baird Callicott, and George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson. A case study of the concept of autonomy is used in exploring the possibility of 
such discourse. This case study is particularly relevant in light of Indigenous peoples’ 
continuing struggles for self-government and appropriate education, as well as their 
attempts to re-assert their unique cultural perspectives. Examples of both Western and 
Indigenous uses of the concept of autonomy are compared and contrasted in 
demonstrating that, although there are differences in their uses of this concept, they can 
be rendered intelligible one to another. Cross-cultural dialogue is indeed possible. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
I see around me a world of many diverse cultures, a multicultural world. I also see 
a world that is rife with conflict, an ongoing struggle between culturally diverse peoples 
who are trying to make a place for themselves in today’s global arena. We are now 
experiencing more cross-cultural interaction than there has been in any other previous 
age. More and more we are faced with the otherness of cultures which are not our own. 
Unfortunately, the diversity of these cultures seems to be a persistent catalyst for the 
ongoing conflicts which are presently being faced by people the world over. The 
resolution of these conflicts is of great concern to me. 
Here in North America, one such conflict has been playing itself out for centuries 
between the Indigenous inhabitants and its European colonists. These distinct cultural 
traditions have been living side-by-side for generations, yet they remain distant. Rather 
than incorporating the understanding, respect and reciprocity of Indigenous peoples, 
mainstream Western culture has marginalized Indigenous peoples through attitudes of 
mere tolerance and isolation. For centuries, the voices of Indigenous peoples have either 
been silenced, or have, at least, fallen on deaf ears. For example, here in North America, 
the silencing of Indigenous peoples’ voices was not only carried out institutionally, as in 
the case of the Residential school system, but also through a variety of other government 
policies of forced assimilation. Recently, though, there has been a concerted effort 
amongst Indigenous peoples to regain their voice. 
Unfortunately, colonists have not felt it necessary to learn Indigenous languages. 
In order to make themselves heard, Indigenous peoples have had to pursue their attempts 
at communication in the language of the dominant culture, which, in North America, 
involves a predominately English-speaking audience. Importantly, this involves a process 
of cross-cultural exchange between cultures whose perspectives exhibit significant 
differences; and these differences stem, in part, from their having developed out of either 
oral or literate traditions. It is a process which is fraught with difficulty. Regardless of the 
fact that numerous Indigenous peoples today speak English, the various cultural 
perspectives which they are attempting to articulate to a Western audience developed 
within the framework of oral traditions. Louis Owens, a Choktaw author, argues: 
For the Indian author, writing within consciousness of the contextual 
background of a non-literate culture, every word written in English 
represents a collaboration of sorts as well as a reorientation (conscious or 
unconscious) from the paradigmatic world of oral tradition to the 
syntagmatic reality of written language.* 
Even taking into consideration such attempts at communication, a seeming 
incommensurability between world views seems to plague the relations between 
Indigenous peoples and the dominant Western culture.^ These problems are not simply a 
matter of translation difficulties. In their paper “Wakinyan Hotan, The Thunder Beings 
Call Out: The Inscrutability of Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics”, Leroy Meyer and Tony 
Ramirez (Pine Ridge Lakota) argue: “Although translation from one disparate way of 
thinking to another is difficult, coming to understand another way of thinking is not a 
‘ Louis Owens. Other Destinies: Understanding the American Indian Novel (Norman; University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1992), 6. 
^ For discussions concerning incommensurability, see: Leroy Meyer and Tony Ramirez. “Wakinyan Hotan, 
The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics” From Our Eyes: Learning 
From Indigenous Peoples (Toronto: Garamound Press, 1996), 89-105; Dennis McPherson and J. Douglas 
Rabb. “Transformative Philosophy and Indigenous Thought: A Comparison of Lakota and Ojibwa World 
Views” Papers of the Twenty-Ninth Algonquian Conference, David H. Pentland, Ed., (Winnipeg: 
University of Manitoba, 1999), 202-210; and Ian Hacking. Representing and Intervening (Cambridge; 
Cambridge UP, 1983). 
question of overcoming the difficulties of translation. Coming to understand another 
world view is ‘learning how to reason’ in the style of the other world view.”^ The 
question which must be asked, then, is as Dennis McPherson (Ojibwa) and J. Douglas 
Rabb indicate: “what is it about literate cultures rooted in Western European civilization 
which makes it difficult for their people to come to grips with the Indigenous oral 
traditions of North America?”"* 
The question, then, which I have put to myself is whether or not differences such 
as those which seem to exist between Western and Indigenous perspectives, serve as an 
impassable barrier in the attempt to resolve issues of cross-cultural conflict. In other 
words, is the establishment of meaningful cross-cultural discourse, philosophical or 
otherwise, possible between people from very different cultural perspectives? 
The problem we are faced with is understanding what is involved in the attempt to 
gain access to another worldview. What is involved here might best be referred to as an 
exploration, or an unpacking, of Indigenous peoples’ use of concepts, including those 
concepts which have been appropriated from Western philosophical traditions. In other 
words, my aim here is to discover what it is about these cultures, or worldviews, which 
sets their use and appropriation of concepts such as autonomy apart. 
I have chosen to focus on the concept of autonomy, first of all, because of its use 
in discussions concerning Indigenous peoples’ struggles for self-government. Secondly, it 
■’ Leroy Meyer and Tony Ramirez. “Wakinyan Hotan, The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of 
Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics” From Our Eyes: Learning From Indigenous Peoples (Toronto: Garamond 
Press, 1996), 92. 
Dennis McPherson and J. Douglas Rabb. “Transformative Philosophy and Indigenous Thought: A 
Comparison of Lakota and Ojibwa World Views” Papers of the Twenty-Ninth Algonquian Conference, 
David H. Pentland, Ed., (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1999), 207. 
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is a concept which seems to lie at the heart of both Western and Indigenous peoples’ 
views on human relations. In the case of Indigenous peoples, this concept arises in 
connection with relations with other human persons as well as with other-than-human 
persons. In other words, it is a concept which lies at the heart of any answer to the 
question of how we ought to live our lives. Since advancing our understanding of how we 
might begin to resolve the conflicts between Indigenous and Western peoples is one of 
the general aims of this study, an exploration of the concept of autonomy seems to be a 
logical choice. Moreover, it is, in my estimation, a concept which is also useful for 
exploring Meyer and Ramirez’s argument that “[cjoming to understand another world 
view is ‘leaning how to reason’ in the style of the other world view.”^ 
In expressing and defending their own perspectives. Indigenous peoples make 
frequent use of such concepts as autonomy. The important question is whether or not 
Native and non-Native people mean the same thing in their use of such concepts. In “A 
Definition of Culture”, Ojibwa scholar Dennis McPherson presents a discussion 
involving the difficulties of defining culture. During his discussion McPherson makes a 
few comments regarding autonomy and related concepts which are relevant here. In 
regard to the concept of culture, he argues that the problems to be faced in arriving at a 
definition of culture are themselves rooted in our cultural differences. In the case of 
Aboriginal peoples, he argues that “an Aboriginal view of culture begins to unfold with 
the lived experiences of real people as a seat of power as well as the power culture has to 
^ Meyer and Ramirez, “Wakinyan Hotan, The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of 
Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics”, 92. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
create and sustain identities, both individual and communal.”^ In other words, an 
Aboriginal view of culture is one which is rooted in a person’s relationship to the world; 
it is a relationship which is the source of meaning in our lives. 
McPherson acknowledges that the concept of culture is somewhat nebulous and 
understood in many different senses, but argues that if ""culture is understood as an 
abstract category, an object of study, a policy field, a bounded topic distinguishable from 
other topics that are not culture, and, in other words, a historically, politically, and 
geographically specific phenomenon, then constructing separations between culture and 
not culture is one of the most difficult areas of cross-cultural communication between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.”^ Reflected in this approach is a distinct split 
between knowledge about one’s culture as something to be analyzed and defined and the 
lived reality of one’s culture. One result of these cultural differences is that arriving at a 
mutually satisfying definition of a concept such as culture becomes markedly more 
difficult. 
Cultural differences also make Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal agreement on the 
concept of autonomy just as difficult. McPherson presents a comparison between North 
American Aboriginal views on the concept of autonomy and a Lockean characterization 
o 
of Western peoples’ understanding of this concept. He does so, he says, in order to 
illustrate a “fundamental difference in the perspectives and cultural practices of 
^ Dennis McPherson. “A Definition of Culture” Native American Religious Identity: Unforgotten Gods, 
Jace Weaver, Ed., (Maryknoll; Orbis Books, 1998), 78. 
^ Ibid., 79. 
* John Locke (1632-1704) is one of the more renown early modem Western (British) philosophers. He 
made a great impact on European political thought with his Two Treatise on Government {\690). 
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Europeans and Aboriginals.”^ In characterizing the Western attitude, he presents both the 
common notion that it is the ‘right of an individual to be self-governing’ as well as a 
more refined legal interpretation, making reference to the rights and powers of 
independent nations. Moreover, he notes that, in order to enjoy the benefits of civil 
society, individuals in Western culture must give up certain freedoms so as to benefit the 
many. In regard to North American Indigenous peoples’ use of this concept, and its 
difference from that of Western culture, McPherson argues: 
Within Aboriginal society, each member exercises his or her individual 
right to give to the group, each exercises ‘equality, liberty, and executive 
power,’ each exercises autonomy. Each has a right to self-governance. One 
must be careful, however, not to confuse the concept of the individual with 
that of autonomy or vice-versa. Nor should one even consider the two 
terms to be in any way synonymous. The concept of individual rights, 
along with concomitant strict, legalistic regulation of individual behaviour, 
are foreign to most Aboriginal traditions. 
Just as cultural differences can lead to Indigenous and Western notions of culture 
which differ in important ways, both of these cultural traditions exhibit formulations of 
the concept of autonomy which vary in notable ways. McPherson has also explored the 
effects of these cultural differences in a previous paper, co-written with Rabb. In their 
paper, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, McPherson and Rabb 
present a “critique of Kantian ethics from a Native American perspective.”*’ In 
illustrating these differences McPherson and Rabb cite the Native Literacy and Life Skills 
Curriculum Guidelines in which the “word 'autonomous' is used to describe the Native 
^ McPherson, “A Definition of Culture”, 92. 
Ibid., 92. 
" Dennis McPherson and J. Douglas Rabb. “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy” 
Ayaangwaamizin: InternationalJournal of Indigenous Philosophy 1:1 Spring (1997), 12. 
Indian child, whereas his or her non-Native counterpart is said to be 'dependent.This 
example, in referring to children as autonomous, stands in stark contrast to the renown 
18 century Western philosopher Immanuel Kant’s articulation of the concept of 
autonomy. Traditional interpretations of Kant’s work hold that Kant would not, on the 
basis of his arguments, recognize children as being autonomous, i.e., as being capable of 
freely subjecting themselves to rational principles. 
The question with which we are now faced is whether or not the meaning of the 
English words used by Indigenous peoples is the same as what their Western audience 
understands by those words. Or, has their meaning been altered, and if so, in what way, 
through their use within the context of this other worldview? In other words, the question 
we are faced with is whether or not the analysis, or interpretation, of meaning in a cross- 
cultural context can be carried out in a meaningful way. This might, at first, seem a trivial 
question, but our use of concepts such as autonomy can quickly take on great 
significance. When it comes to the restructuring of our education systems in the name of 
‘appropriate education’ it is our children’s futures we are taking into our hands. 
Moreover, words such as autonomy and autonomous also lie at the very heart of 
discussions concerning social freedoms and reforms, such as Indigenous peoples’ struggle 
for self-government. 
One seemingly insignificant example arises in the title of the McPherson and 
Rabb article “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”. Take note, please, of 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 15. The italics are my own. 
Also, see: British Columbia Ministry of Education. Native Literacy and Life Skills Curriculum Guidelines 
(Victoria, BC: Ministry of Advanced Education and Job Training, and Ministry Responsible for Science 
and Technology, 1989), 13-15. 
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the fact that in the title of their article they refer to 'a Native Philosophy’, when the title 
might just as easily have been ‘Some Thought on Articulating Native Philosophy’. The 
use of the word ‘a’ seems to convey the connotation of it being a discrete body of thought 
to be studied, and represents, in an important sense, a split between Native philosophy as 
merely a topic, a field of study, or a set of ideas to be analyzed or defined, and the lived, 
all encompassing, reality of that philosophy. To a Western reader, this seemingly 
ineffectual ‘a’ caries with it the history of Western peoples’ persistence in classifying 
things, including what is and what is not Native philosophy: that what McPherson and 
Rabb are attempting to articulate, philosophically speaking, is a ‘set of ideas to be 
analyzed or defined’. In fact, this is what McPherson and Rabb hope to avoid. 
If we find that these difficulties in communication can be overcome, then we can, 
through a continuing process of discourse, begin to share and learn from the valuable 
insights which each culture possesses. On the other hand, if the problems involved in 
cross-cultural interpretation cannot be overcome then we can search out ways to simply 
live with the problem of incommensurability. However, the premature and pessimistic 
acceptance of the inevitability of incommensurability is an act which serves no other 
purpose than to allow us to retreat to the security and single-mindedness of our own 
particular culture. Given the present global interaction between cultures, such a retreat is 
not only futile but merely perpetuates the problems with which we are currently faced. If 
we are going to function effectively as a global community we must develop more fully 
our understanding of all diverse cultures. 
In short, this study is concerned with advancing our understanding of the 
problems faced by both Indigenous and Western peoples in communicating effectively 
9 
their ideas to each other, as well as their attempts to understand the perspective of the 
other. Philosophically speaking, the problem is not a matter of which culture has the right 
definition or formulation of a particular concept, but rather, a difficulty in understanding 
the context in which a particular concept has been used and why it has been adopted.*^ 
Gaining access to the other’s perspective, or the conceptual framework of another culture, 
is our paramount concern. 
Careful attention must be paid to the ways different cultural perspectives shape 
not only the structure of our expressions but also our perceptions of the world and our 
formulation of the concepts we use to talk about it. For example, David Abram, in his 
book The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human- 
World, writes: 
As we grow into a particular culture or language, we implicitly begin to 
structure our sensory contact with the earth around us in a particular 
manner, paying attention to certain phenomena while ignoring others, 
differentiating textures, tastes, and tones in accordance with the verbal 
contrasts contained in the language.*"* 
Any attempt at resolving cross-cultural conflicts must take these issues into 
account. Understanding how a concept is being used in a worldview other than one’s own 
involves more than simply translating their words and concepts into one’s own language. 
If we are going to agree with Meyer and Ramirez that “[cjoming to understand a world 
For further discussion related to cultural authenticity and cultural invention, see: Allan Hanson. “The 
Making of the Maori: Cultural Invention and its Logic” American Anthropologist 9\\A December (1989): 
890-902. and Todd Dufresne. “Anthropology and the Invention of Deconstruction: A Brief Survey” 
Alternative Routes 12 (1995): 63-79. 
David Abram. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human-World 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 255. 
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view is ‘learning how to reason’ in the style of the other world view,”’^ then we must 
keep issues such as those which Abram mentions in full view at all times. The distinct 
traditions, and geographical circumstances, of a People work together in unique ways to 
produce distinct cultural views on the world. 
The methodology of this study relies on the work done by Rabb in his article 
“Prologues to Native Philosophy: Some Research Methodologies”.'^ However, I have 
found it necessary to apply the methodologies he has outlined in my own particular way. 
The reason for these adaptations is that, as Rabb has argued, such discussions seem to, by 
their very nature, generate “new research methodologies in response to novel research 
1 7 
problems”. 
My goal here is to examine whether the seemingly insurmountable differences 
between Western and Indigenous perspectives can be overcome and, thus, allow room for 
meaningful cross-cultural philosophical discourse. In pursuit of this goal I have chosen, 
first of all, to look into both the European analytical and phenomenological traditions. I 
also look to the traditions, narratives, and contemporary critical discourse of North 
American Indigenous peoples for philosophical insights about language, meaning, and 
perception. Secondly, in presenting a case study of the concept of autonomy it necessary 
to look into all three of these divergent perspectives for any implicit or explicit discourse 
on the concept of autonomy. Several different formulations of the notion of autonomy are 
Meyer and Ramirez, “Wakinyan Hotan, The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of 
Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics”, 92. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
J. Douglas Rabb. “Prologues to Native Philosophy: Some Research Methodologies” European Review 
of Native American Studies 9\\ (1995): 23-25. 
Ibid., 23. 
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presented in the hope that each particular view can be more clearly understood through 
comparison with other formulations. To be clear, it is not my contention that each of 
these cultures has a static notion of autonomy which can be clearly contrasted with any 
other culture’s formulation of that same concept. 
My case study of the concept of autonomy, presented in Chapter Four, involves 
two adaptations of a method developed by Michael M. Pomedli in his book 
Ethnophilosophical and Ethnolinguistic Perspectives on the Huron Indian Soul. 
Throughout my study I will refer to his method as conceptual archaeology. My study has 
also been inspired by and modeled after the work carried out by Overholt and Callicott in 
Clothed in Fur and Other Tales: An Introduction to an Ojibwa World View. Rabb 
describes their methodology as one which “amounts to a combination of philosophical 
1 o 
analysis and literary criticism.” My focus, however, is on philosophical literature as 
opposed to imaginative literature, such as the Ojibwa narrative material which Overholt 
and Callicott examine. The aim of this philosophical analysis is to extract implicit and 
explicit philosophical concepts, or insights, contained in the three distinct traditions 
which are involved in my investigation (analytic, phenomenological and Indigenous). 
Although I do look at some literary texts, the bulk of my concern is with philosophical 
literature. 
In the case of Overholt and Callicott, their concern is with “the most general, or 
macro, of all conceptual systems”*^ through which they wish to “provide some access to a 
Ibid., 24. 
’’ Thomas W. Overholt and J. Baird Callicott. Clothed in Fur and Other Tales: An Introduction to an 
Ojibwa World View (Lanham: University Press of America, 1982), 20. 
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very different way of viewing reality for an audience of non-specialists by means of an 
approach which is informal.” In other words, their intent is to elucidate common themes 
and concepts throughout Ojibwa narratives so as to provide at least a cursory glimpse of 
the perspective which created those narratives. Their focus is on the narrative tradition of 
the Ojibwa in particular and, especially, with the “pedagogical and archival purposes”^^ 
of these narratives. In their own words. Clothed in Fur and Other Tales is an attempt at 
the analysis of Ojibwa narratives in order to answer the following question: “what is the 
shape of the world as it is mirrored in these narratives?” Thus, their concern is with both 
the philosophical and literary aspects of these narratives. 
My purpose here differs from their work in a way to which Overholt and Callicott 
themselves point. Given their general approach to the Ojibwa worldview, they argue that 
such a “world view might be more rigorously approached through multiple micro-belief- 
systems studies” with the hope of arriving “at a precise formulation of the ‘structural 
meanings’ (i.e., the culturally conditioned structure of usage) of various concepts.In 
other words, they are arguing that a more thorough understanding of a culture’s belief 
systems might be had through the examination of specific aspects of that culture’s belief 







This study is offered as an attempt at the analysis of one such micro-belief system. 
The hope is that, in examining the specific uses of concepts in a particular culture, a more 
complete understanding of the formulation, or articulation, of those concepts can be 
obtained. Thus, a more thorough understanding of that culture’s general worldview can 
be arrived at as well. My examination also differs from the work of Callicott and 
Overholt in that their concern is with only the Ojibwa culture, whereas my concerns are 
cross-cultural. I compare and contrast formulations of one particular micro-belief-system, 
that of autonomy, in different cultures, both Native and non-Native. 
It is necessary, first of all, to gain a clearer picture of some of the complicating 
factors which might affect a culture’s formulation and expression of a particular concept. 
An examination of these complicating factors is carried out in Chapter Three. More 
specifically, my concern in Chapter Three is with exploring insights on the relationship 
between perception and meaning, and its influence on the articulation of concepts within 
both Native and non-Native worldviews. An exploration of this relationship involves both 
(1) languages’ roots in the physical landscape, and (2) the relationships between language 
and the living landscape and a peoples’ perceptions of their surroundings. This Chapter 
also involves a critical examination of the impact of the differences between orality and 
literacy on the use of concepts in Indigenous and Western cultures. This discussion, 
however, is merely a preamble to Chapter Four in which I present a cross-cultural 
examination of the concept of autonomy, with the aid of a few carefully selected 
examples from both Western and Indigenous traditions. 
The methodological approach of my fourth and final chapter, involves a twofold 
adaptation of Pomedli’s conceptual archaeology. My concern is with the use of the 
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concept of autonomy in both Western and North American Indigenous cultures. It is my 
intent, in comparing and contrasting specific uses of this concept in these divergent 
cultures, to demonstrate the relevance of such factors as orality and literacy in examining, 
or understanding, the specific uses of the concept of autonomy which arise in a particular 
culture. My hope, in sum, is to shed some light on how we might move beyond the 
communication problems which continue to plague the relations between Indigenous and 
Western peoples. 
My personal interest in this subject material is a result of my exposure to courses 
in both the Philosophy Program as well as the Indigenous Learning Program at Lakehead 
University. Along with my increasing awareness of the historical and contemporary 
struggles of North American Indigenous peoples came a need to understand these 
problems to their fullest. In my estimation, there is an urgency to these issues which 
requires a requisite amount of careful attention and thoughtful investigation. I do not 
presume to speak for Indigenous peoples, not being one myself, but I do offer up this 
investigation for what it might be worth. I offer it in hope that it might aid Indigenous 
peoples in their efforts in even some small way. 
My aim in this study is to show that developing an understanding of Indigenous 
peoples’ use of Western concepts such as ‘autonomy’ is possible, and that Indigenous 
uses of such concepts, and the various worldviews in which those concepts are used, need 
not remain inaccessible to a Western audience. It is not simply a matter of pinning down 
correct and incorrect uses of such concepts, but rather a matter of coming to see that there 
is indeed a common ground which allows for the mutual intelligibility of Western and 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural perspectives. It is this common ground which opens up the 
15 
possibility of such cross-cultural exchanges. Only through developing a clearer 
understanding of how concepts such as autonomy are being used within these various 
cultural perspectives can we begin to move beyond the cultural and philosophical 
stalemate between Western and Indigenous peoples here in North America. 
16 
CHAPTER TWO: PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGIES 
IN A CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Pomedli’s Conceptual Archaeology 
Central to this study are the problems involved in articulating and interpreting the 
meaning or use of particular words or concepts between different cultural perspectives, 
for example, perspectives such as the Ojibwa worldview and the Western worldview. 
Indigenous peoples’ present day efforts to articulate their perspectives, rooted in oral 
traditions, to a Western audience, grounded in literate traditions, are hampered by a 
dilemma which is now referred to by some academics as the incommensurability 
problem. Differences between these cultural perspectives seem to limit the ability of these 
divergent groups to communicate effectively their positions one to another. An invaluable 
aid in exploring the difficulties of cross-cultural communication is the methodological 
approach found in Canadian philosopher Michael M. Pomedli’s study Ethnophilosophical 
and Ethnolinguistic Perspective on the Huron Indian Soul. It is, in particular, his method 
of conceptual archaeology which has provided me with a framework for pursuing a 
cross-cultural treatment of the concept of autonomy.' 
Unlike Western traditions, the Huron people did not keep written records of 
individuals’ philosophical thoughts. This means that there are no direct sources to look to 
for linking particular views with specific Huron individuals as is the case with Western 
philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. Given this lack of first-hand accounts required for 
' Pomedli’s methodology is described in this way by J. Douglas Rabb in his article, “Prologues to Native 
Philosophy: Some Research Methodologies” European Review of Native American Studies 9:1 (1995): 23- 
25. 
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acquiring a complete understanding of the Huron peoples’ understanding of soul, Pomedli 
turned to the Jesuit Relations (along with other historical texts) in hope of finding a link 
to the thoughts of pre-contact Huron people. He did so arguing: “Since the early Hurons 
themselves did not leave any written documents, our primary source materials are the 
accounts, sermons, dictionaries and grammars of 17^’’- and 1 S^^’-century explorers and 
missionaries to North America.” Such a choice might at first seem to be an incredibly 
daunting task when one considers the degree of ethnocentric bias these works are 
understood to contain. However, Pomedli made this choice on the grounds that religious, 
or spiritual, matters were important for both the Jesuit and Huron peoples. Thus, the 
Jesuits were better able to gain access to Huron religious concepts than other scholars 
with more political or economic interests in North America. This is not to say, however, 
that there were no difficulties to be faced in accessing the Huron worldview through such 
early contact literature. Pomedli writes that: 
although the missionaries initially tended to deny the existence of or 
trivialize the content of Huron spiritual practices, these same missionaries 
gradually began to realize that there was some validity to both the form 
and content of Huron beliefs.^ 
Pre-contact Huron thought, then, is available to us, but it is shrouded by a veil of 
European thought. The problem which must be addressed, Pomedli argues, “is how to 
ferret out the early Huron strands in a largely European garment.”"^ The approach which 
Pomedli employs for solving this problem is twofold. The first aspect of Pomedli’s 
^ Michael M. Pomedli. Ethnophilosophical and Ethnolinguistic Perspectives on the Huron Indian Soul 
(Lewiston; Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), xi. 
^ Ibid., xii. 
Ubid., 1. 
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approach involves a familiarization with the religious and philosophical presuppositions 
of 17^'^-century European thought. The second aspect involves a re-examination of the 
translations of the various Huron concepts of soul, making allowances for the 
presuppositions of the translators. In other words, we must develop an understanding of 
the philosophical and theological traditions according to which the missionaries of that 
era were trained so we can more readily recognize its influence on their writings, 
influences such as the limiting and elimination of certain uses of that concept. In his 
review of Pomedli’s methodology Rabb reminds us that looking to the Jesuit Relations 
for insights into the Huron concept of soul can be justified on the grounds that “the Jesuit 
philosophy is well understood and any trained philosopher should be able to make 
allowances for it.”^ 
Pomedli begins his investigation with an account of the philosophical training of 
the Jesuits. He looks to the philosophies of both Plato and Aristotle. The reason for this is 
that both of these philosophies have had a formative influence on Christianity, and 
Western religious thought in general. Although they differ substantially in their positions 
on the nature of the soul, both philosophers made important contributions which have had 
a lasting effect on European thought. Pomedli writes that according to Plato’s other- 
worldly notion of the soul, “the soul’s proper life is not with the body, then, but with the 
world of ideas, from which it descends, and to which it returns upon the body’s death.”^ 
In contrast, Aristotle’s position is that the body and soul are “not two different 
substances..., nor does the soul preexist or exist without the body; it naturally constitutes 
^ Rabb, “Prologues to Native Philosophy”, 23. 
^ Pomedli, Ethnophilosophical and Ethnolinguistic Perspectives on the Huron Indian Soul, 8. 
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n 
with the body a single living being.” Plato and Aristotle helped establish the European 
o 
religious belief in the “spiritual interrelationship” between an immaterial soul and a 
corporeal body. In addition to this view of the soul there was also the Aristotelian notion 
of an “unmoved mover, the soul of the outermost heavens,”^ which strongly influenced 
the concept of God in Western monotheistic religions. 
In his examination of the Jesuit’s training Pomedli also looked to the theological 
doctrines of both Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo. Although these doctrines 
find most of their grounding in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Pomedli reminds 
us that it was, for the most part, the theological teachings of scholars such as Aquinas and 
Augustine which formed the religious, or spiritual, bias which missionaries brought to 
their interpretation of Huron beliefs. It is these theological beliefs for which allowances 
must be made in an examination of Huron beliefs in texts such as the Jesuit Relations. 
This process, however, was only the first stage of Pomedli’s method. 
Since the Jesuits were missionaries, their efforts were aimed at translating 
Christian teachings, such as catechisms and sermons, into the Huron language. Huron 
words were used to express Jesuit beliefs which were not fully compatible with the Huron 
words which had been chosen. Pomedli explains: 
Since the Jesuits in particular wanted initially to translate and consider 
their culture and religious traditions as normative and even as absolute, it 
was difficult for them to appreciate another cultural thrust. The Huron 
Ubid., 13. 
^ Ibid., 12. 
Ubid., 15. 
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words, squeezed into European Procrustean beds, remain articulate, 
nevertheless.^^ 
In other words, although Huron words were endowed with European religious 
meanings, we still have a rich record of Huron religious terminology at our disposal. It is 
at this point that Pomedli looks to both early-contact dictionaries as well as the later 
compilations of those dictionaries which “communicate native ideas more directly and 
frankly than the early-contact dictionaries do, and also more frankly than the French, 
Latin, and Italian Relations which were written for European readers.”*' It is, then, 
through a combination of compensating for European biases, such as the belief in only 
one type of soul, and an examination of dictionaries containing numerous Huron terms 
used to denote different types of soul that Pomedli attempts to clarify our understanding 
of the Huron peoples’ conception of soul. 
Pomedli’s conclusions are not as surprising as one might expect. His conclusions 
do, however, provide a stark contrast to the conclusions contained in historical documents 
such as those of the Jesuits. Pomedli notes that the “Jesuits characterized the Huron 
position very simply by stating that they did philosophy with their feet rather than with 
their heads.” The demeaning intonation of this statement reveals to us the self-inflating 
arrogance and single-mindedness of these early missionaries. However, behind this veil 
of European philosophical and religious predispositions, Pomedli claims that we find that 
not only do the “Hurons give evidence of an insightful concept of the soul”*^ but also that 




“the Huron heritage presented a rich spiritual mosaic.”*"^ As a result of their biases, 
Pomedli concludes: 
The missionaries... missed many opportunities to appreciate the content 
and ramifications of the Huron conceptions of the soul... [and that these] 
missed opportunities tended to heighten the differences between two 
religious approaches, adding further justification to the necessity to 
convert Hurons to Christianity.*^ 
Pomedli’s method, then, involves an examination of European translations of 
Huron concepts to demonstrate the limits of those very translations that were used by 
missionaries to explain the nature of Western religious beliefs to the Huron people. He 
demonstrates those limits through a comparison of the Jesuit’s narrow translation of 
Huron concepts and the numerous Huron terms found in dictionaries which were 
compiled during that same era. 
Two Adaptations of Pomedli’s Conceptual Archaeology 
In order to carry out the case study which I present in Chapter Four, I have found 
it necessary to adapt Pomedli’s method in two ways. Whereas Pomedli looked to 
European historical records for insights into the Huron conception of the soul, I, in a 
sense, turn Pomedli on his head. Rather than exploring the adoption of Huron words by 
missionaries to explain the Christian concept of soul as Pomedli does, my first adaptation 
of his methodology involves an examination of the present day adoption of Western 
terminology (such as the concept of autonomy) by North American Indigenous peoples in 
^Ubid., 155. 
Ibid., 3. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
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an attempt to make their own particular worldviews more clear to the dominant Western 
culture. 
Indigenous peoples have been unceasing in their efforts to re-assert their cultural 
heritage and bring an end to the perpetuation of misguided Western interpretations of 
Indigenous worldviews. As a result of the history of forced acculturation (including 
language acquisition) which has been experienced by Indigenous peoples in North 
America, they have developed a familiarity with the perspectives and traditions of the 
Western worldview. It is this familiarity with both their own traditions as well as Western 
traditions that is of importance. Unlike the Jesuits who lacked prior exposure to the 
traditions of North American Indigenous peoples, present day Indigenous peoples have 
the advantage of that familiarity on which to base their choice of Western concepts in 
articulating their own perspectives and traditions to a Western audience. 
Thus, the particular concepts Indigenous peoples adopt from Western traditions 
can provide significant insight about Indigenous cultures based on their affinity for 
particular Western concepts. Moreover, the particular concepts which they choose to 
adopt can reveal not only insights about the content of Indigenous cultures but also their 
reasons for gravitating toward particular concepts from Western traditions. There seems 
to be little wonder in the fact that Indigenous peoples, having been marginalized by the 
dominant Western mainstream culture, have adopted concepts such as autonomy in their 
attempt to clarify and re-assert their cultural presence in North America. It is not my 
intent, however, to claim that the adoption of these concepts signifies a direct correlation 
between Indigenous peoples own concepts and those they have adopted from Western 
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traditions. Rather, I argue that Indigenous peoples recognize certain affinities between 
some of their own views and the content of certain Western concepts, in whole or in part. 
My second adaptation of Pomedli’s methodology concerns the formulation of 
Western concepts in their original Western context. Where Pomedli was concerned with 
the biases of the Jesuits in their translation of Huron concepts, my concern is with the 
cultural biases of Western philosophers in articulating those very concepts that 
Indigenous peoples have seen fit to adopt. In the case of Pomedli’s work, missionaries 
who came to North America brought with them both religious and philosophical biases 
which resulted in their tendency to limit the content of Huron concepts. These limitations 
resulted in missionaries downplaying certain Huron uses of the concept of soul which 
contradicted, or were incongruent with, Western religious views. Pomedli writes: 
“Reductions of sacred native terms to a pejorative understanding was quite common.”*^ 
In a similar way, the biases or assumptions of Western philosophers have resulted in a 
tendency to limit the content of certain concepts, thus limiting the parameters of their 
usage. For example, although Kant writes that autonomy is the “basis of the dignity of 
both human nature and every rational nature”*^ he seems to restrict autonomy to only 
human persons, with the exception of granting it to higher beings such as angels and God. 
This restriction seems to involve the assumption that humans are the only creatures on 
Earth which possess a rational nature, or at least are persons. 
Ibid., 156. 
Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Trans., Lewis White Beck, in Beck 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment? (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 
53. 
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Kant admits that we can only know other beings insofar as they are appearances, 
but he fails to recognize the possibility that some other species on earth might also have a 
sense of inner experience, that they might be an in itself, a noumenal self, which is, in 
some sense, rational, though maybe not identical to human reason.*^ I also suggest, as 
Pomedli does, that not only established philosophical views but also theological views 
(such as religious hierarchies in which, generally speaking, God is on top and animals are 
near the bottom) have also contributed, in part, to the tendency to limit the meaning, or 
more precisely, the use of such concepts as person, self and autonomy. It is these 
predispositions, both philosophical and theological, which we must keep in full view 
when examining the possibility of affinities between what is meant by both Indigenous 
and Western peoples in their use of a word such as autonomy. 
The aim, then, of my twofold adaptation of Pomedli’s methodology is to explore, 
on the one hand, the use of Western concepts by Indigenous peoples and, on the other 
hand, the use of those very same concepts by Western philosophers. In describing some 
particular uses of the concept of autonomy I hope, as I stated previously, to bring into 
relief the different contexts, or conceptual frameworks, in which we find the concept of 
autonomy being used. In other words, an examination of what Overholt and Callicott 
refer to as the “formulation of ‘structural meanings’ (i.e., the culturally conditioned 
structure of usage) of various concepts.”*^ Unlike Overholt and Callicott, the focus of my 
concern is, of course, with the concept of autonomy. 
This is discussed again in Chapter Four, p. 74-76. 
Thomas W. Overholt and J. Baird Callicott. Clothed in Fur and Other Tales: An Introduction to an 
Ojibwa World View (Lanham: University Press of America, 1982), 20. 
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Lakoff and Johnson: The Use of Metaphor 
Also central to my discussion in Chapter Four are Lakoff and Johnson’s 
arguments concerning the role of metaphor in reasoning processes. They argue: “Our 
ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.Just as Pomedli gave consideration to the philosophical and 
theological biases of the Jesuits in his study of the Huron peoples’ notions of soul, it 
follows from Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments that we must also consider the influence 
particular uses of metaphor have on peoples’ understanding and use of concepts. In 
Metaphors We Live By, they argue: 
Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical 
concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic 
expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an 
understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.^ ^ 
Lakoff and Johnson provide the following useful example to illustrate their point. 
Consider a metaphor used, generally speaking, in Western culture: the ‘Argument is War’ 
metaphor, which arises in several forms, such as “‘I demolished his argument.’... [and] 
‘He shot down all of my arguments.’” The point which Lakoff and Johnson are trying to 
make is not just that we talk in such metaphorical terms, but also that we think and act in 
such metaphorical terms. They argue: 
We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can 
abandon it and take a new line of defense. Many of the things we do in 
arguing are partially structured by the concept of war.... It is in this sense 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 
1980), 3. 
Ibid., 7. 
Ibid., 4. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
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that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; 
it structures the actions we perform in arguing. 
In contrast to this use of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson urge us to imagine a 
culture which does not make use of this particular metaphor, a People who have, for 
example, framed their understanding of the concept of argument (or argumentation) in 
terms of the metaphor of a dance. Lakoff and Johnson argue that in “such a culture, 
people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out 
differently, and talk about them differently. But we would probably not view them as 
arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different. 
Although Lakoff and Johnson’s concerns are primarily with the use of metaphor 
in a Western context, their arguments are, nonetheless, very significant for cross-cultural 
contexts. In the case of Western and Indigenous cultures, a failure on the part of Western 
people to understand what is being articulated by Native peoples might very easily result 
from an unfamiliarity with the metaphorical frameworks in which concepts are being 
used, e.g., those arising in oral traditions. In a Western context, a metaphor such as ‘the 
letter of the law’ provides a clear example of a metaphor which relies heavily on literate 
traditions for its meaning.^^ In their recent book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied 
Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, Lakoff and Johnson argue: “Metaphorical 
idioms are philosophically important in... [that] they open up the possibility that a 
Ibid., 4. The italics are my own. 
Ibid., 5. 
This example is discussed again in Chapter Four, p.77. 
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significant part of the lexical differences across languages may have to do with 
differences in conventional imagery.”"^ 
Moreover, it seems likely that a failure on the part of some Western philosophers 
to recognize the philosophical perspectives of Indigenous peoples as philosophical 
perspectives also stems, in part, from an unfamiliarity with the metaphorical frameworks 
within which those views are being articulated. Given the relevance of metaphor to 
reasoning processes, as Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate in Metaphors We Live By, they 
argue: 
we have found that metaphor is pervasive, not merely in our language but 
in our conceptual system. It seems inconceivable to us that any 
phenomenon so fundamental to our conceptual system could not be central 
97 
to an account of truth and meaning. 
Since my study has in view just such issues as exploring the use of concepts 
within particular conceptual frameworks, I find Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments 
extremely useful for my case study of the concept of autonomy. It is our understanding of 
these culturally conditioned uses of concepts which serves as a ground for resolving 
philosophical problems regarding the nature of such concepts, as well as problems arising 
from the use of these concepts in attempts at cross-cultural philosophical discourse. 
In regard to such attempts at examining the meaning of concepts in a cross- 
cultural context, Pomedli argues: “One approach to studying, comparing and evaluating 
diverse cultural forms and specific themes in cultures is to label the task as impossible. 
This judgment is based on the premise that cultures distinct in time and varied in 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 69. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 210-211. 
28 
development are quite foreign and their concepts incommensurable.”^^ However, in both 
Pomedli’s and Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments we see that this is not the case. The 
various perspectives of other cultures are accessible to us. What is required, Pomedli 
says, is that we “become acquainted with the terrain” of each of these cultural worlds. 
We must develop a familiarity with not only the landscape of metaphors unique to each of 
these cultural worlds but also the ways a People engage and reason about the world in 
which they find themselves. We must develop a familiarity with, or an understanding of, 
the underlying ground which ultimately allows for the possibility of rendering each of 
these cultural perspectives intelligible one to another. 
Pomedli, Ethnophilosophical and Ethnolinguistic Perspectives on the Huron Indian Soul, 1. 
29 Ibid., 1. 
CHAPTER THREE: 
Language, the Lifeworld, and Ways of Reasoning 
29 
In contrast to the so-called problem of incommensurability, an essentially 
isolating view according to which different cultural worlds must ultimately remain 
inaccessible, African-American writer Charles Johnson argues that “what we have from 
the standpoint of phenomenology, are not different worlds but instead innumerable 
perspectives on one world; and we know that when it comes to the crunch, we share, all 
of us, the same cultural Lifeworld.”* There are, to be sure, difficulties which must be 
faced in exploring the use of concepts in a cross-cultural context, e.g., between 
Indigenous and Western worldviews. However, if approached with openness and 
humility, these difficulties can be overcome. To do so, we must turn our attention to the 
‘ways of reasoning’ which underlie these diverse cultural perspectives, and some of the 
factors which serve in shaping those ‘ways of reasoning’. 
Husserl’s Phenomenological Project and the Lifeworld 
The Western philosophical tradition which I look to for insights in this chapter is 
that of phenomenology. David Abram argues that it is phenomenology which “has most 
forcefully called into question the modem assumption of a single, wholly determinable, 
objective reality.” Edmund Husserl, the founding father of phenomenology, saw the 
development of Western philosophy as the ongoing pursuit of ideas about an objectively 
' Charles Johnson. Being and Race: Black Writing since 1970 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1990), 44. 
^ David Abram. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1996), 31. 
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determinate (and ultimately knowable) universe. In rejecting these pursuits Husserl 
argued that only “a radical inquiry back into subjectivity...can make objective truth 
comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning of the world.”^ This involves a 
rejection of the idea that our ideas correspond to (or are perfect representations of) the 
objects they are about. In other words, the peculiarities of subjective experience cannot be 
pared away from the objects which the sciences study. 
Husserl saw phenomenology as the science of experience. He saw that previous 
philosophers had, knowingly or unknowingly, ignored people’s daily experience of the 
world in attempts to describe reality as it is in itself. In contrast, Husserl saw reality as 
being fundamentally experiential. In a cross-cultural context, Husserl’s arguments lead us 
to the position that different cultural perspectives are not attempts at describing the world 
in itself, descriptions which cultures have either gotten right or gotten wrong. Rather, 
different cultural perspectives can now be viewed as reflections of different groups of 
people’s subjective experience of the world. For Husserl, our experience of reality is 
profoundly subjective. Abram captures Husserl’s sentiments when he writes: 
For whatever we perceive is necessarily entwined with our own 
subjectivity, already blended with the dynamism of life and sentience. The 
living pulse of subjective experience cannot finally be stripped from the 
things that we study (in order to expose the pure unadulterated “objects”) 
without the things themselves losing all existence for us."^ 
However, Husserl did not and could not stop there. His subjectivism meant that he 
had to deal with the problem of solipsism: the possibility that an individual’s perceptions 
are merely a product of that individual’s own mind. In other words, the problem which 
^ Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction 
to Phenomenological Philosophy, Trans., David Carr, (Evanston: Northern University Press, 1970), 69. 
^ Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 34. 
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Husserl had to contend with was that if it is only perceptions that we are in direct contact 
with, then we can no longer be sure that objects and other minds have any substance 
beyond our perceptions of them. If it is only our private perceptions that we are in direct 
contact with, then there is the question of whether we can actually know that those 
perceptions are not simply products of our own imagination. In a larger, multicultural 
context, it is the question of whether these different cultural perspectives arise in 
connection with a group of people’s shared experience of the world, or whether these 
sometimes radically different perspectives are simply some sort of collective delusion. To 
avoid the problem of solipsism a common ground is required. In Cartesian Meditations: 
An Introduction to Phenomenology, Husserl writes: “The Nature and the whole world that 
are constituted ‘immanently’ in the ego are only my ‘ideas’ and have behind them the 
world that exists in itself”^ 
However, Husserl was still faced with problem of providing his critics with an 
answer to the problem of how we come to know that there are other selves, or objects, in 
the world. For Husserl it was the human body which provided a clue to answering this 
question of the existence of other selves. David Abram, in The Spell of the Sensuous, 
relates Husserl’s response to this problem, writing: 
Husserl struggled long and hard to answer this important criticism. How 
does our subjective experience enable us to recognize the reality of other 
selves, other experiencing beings? The solution seemed to implicate the 
body - one’s own as well as that of the other - as a singularly important 
structure within the phenomenal field. The body is that mysterious and 
multifaceted phenomenon that seems always to accompany one’s 
awareness, and indeed to be the very location of one’s awareness within 
the field of appearances.... While one’s own body is experienced, as it 
^ Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, Trans., Dorion Cairns, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 89-90. 
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were, only from within, these other bodies are experienced from outside; 
one can vary one’s distance from these bodies and can move around them, 
while this is impossible in relation to one’s own body.^ 
In other words, of all the objects that I meet in my experience of the world, my 
own body is, in Husserl’s words, the only “which I "rule and govern' immediately"^ from 
the ‘inside’. I experience the world through the senses of this body. The human body acts 
as a center of experience for my awareness. I am aware of the world around me through 
this body. Now, I also see around me other human bodies. Husserl’s argument is that in 
recognizing the similarities between those other bodies and my own there is the further 
recognition that each is also a center of experience, another Self. Husserl writes: “The 
‘Other’, according to his own constituted sense, points to me myself; the other is a 
‘mirroring’ of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self 
o 
and yet again not an analogue in the usual sense.” 
Other’s bodies are a part of my field of experience, but I recognize along with that 
body a subjective center of experience which guides the other’s body through its own 
field of experience (its experience of other objects in its field of experience which it does 
not rule and govern immediately). I have a perception of myself as a center of experience 
(which includes the phenomenon of my own body insofar as I exercise control over it) as 
well as an experience of phenomena which I do not have this sort of control over. As for a 
phenomenon which resembles my own form (other humans), I make the supposition that 
this other form, or human body, is also a center of experience which experiences the 
^ Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 37. 
^ Husserl, Cartesian Mediations, 97. 
^ Ibid., 94. 
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world in a similar twofold fashion. Thus, an individual's experience of the world involves 
an experience of what is Self what is Other. 
A part of that Other is other centers of experience, or other persons', and they, too, 
contribute to my sense of Self through their responses to me. As Husserl says, the other is 
a ‘mirroring’ of my own self But the other does not provide a perfect reflection of 
myself, it is not a mirroring proper. Other people provide me with a view of myself 
which would be, otherwise, inaccessible to me. They, in a sense, watch my social back. 
Similarly, in a cross-cultural context, we see that there are different cultural perspectives 
in the world, or different worldviews. What follows is that we can now view other 
cultures as analogues of our own culture. Different cultures do not live in different, 
completely separate worlds. Rather, other worldviews provide us with perspectives on 
this world which would otherwise be inaccessible to us. They show us different ways of 
perceiving and thinking about the world which aid us in understanding our own 
perspective. In other words, as noted above, “what we have from the standpoint of 
phenomenology, are not different worlds but instead innumeral perspectives on one 
world”^ 
So, in responding to charges of solipsism, Husserl has presented us with a view of 
reality which not only counters the previous philosophical position of an objective 
physical realm (matter) which is observed by an independent observer (mind), but also 
opens up to us a view of the world which provides a very new ground for our knowledge 
and experience of our surroundings. Abram, in The Spell of the Sensuous, describes 
Husserl’s position as one in which: 
^ Johnson, Being and Race, 44. 
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The “real world” in which we find ourselves, then - the very world our 
sciences strive to fathom - is not a sheer “object”, not a fixed and finished 
“datum” from which all subjects and subjective qualities could be pared 
away, but is rather an intertwined matrix of sensations and perceptions, a 
collective field of experience lived through from many different angles.*^ 
An individual’s experience of an object, or phenomenon, in the field of 
appearances is not simply a subjective affair. It involves an experience of what Husserl 
referred to as an intersubjectivity, the experience of phenomena by many experiencing 
subjects. For example, objects such as rocks and trees are experienced (in unique ways 
and from unique angles) by many different persons. Husserl referred to this collective 
field of experience as the Lebenswelt, or Lifeworld. The lifeworld is what is immediately 
present to us before we begin to organize and analyse our experience. Husserl writes that 
“the life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance 
for us, the ‘ground’ of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical.”** Moreover, as I 
show in discussing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and David Abram, this lifeworld 
is not simply there in a passive sense, but plays an active role in shaping our experiences 
and perspectives, both individual and cultural. Importantly, Husserl makes note of the fact 
that “[tjhere has never been a scientific inquiry into the way in which the life-world 
constantly functions as subsoil, into how its manifold prelogical validities act as grounds 
for the logical ones, for theoretical truths [such as physical theories set out by Newton or 
Einstein, or ethnometaphysical theories about the world/reality in general].As Abram 
notes in The Spell of the Sensuous: 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 39. 
" Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 142. 
Ibid., 124. The additions in square brackets are my own. 
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Husserl’s writings seem to suggest that the life-world has various layers, 
that underneath the layer of the diverse cultural life-worlds reposes a 
deeper, more unitary life-world, always already there beneath all our 
cultural acquisitions, a vast and continually overlooked dimension of 
experience that nevertheless supports and sustains all our diverse and 
discontinuous worldviews. 
Husserl, unfortunately, argued that the thing which experienced this life world was 
a transcendental ego, a ‘mind’ separate from the world of phenomena. In our experience 
of reality each of us is aware of ourselves as a center of experience as well as a physical 
being (which we have control over), but our sense of self arises as a result of being a 
center of experience. It is as though, in Husserl’s view, our body is merely a tool for 
experiencing the world; it is a tool which facilitates our experience of the world, but 
which does not contribute to our experience of the world in any significant way. In other 
words, his philosophical tendencies led to what Abram aptly describes as the “lingering 
assumption of a transcendental ego,”'"^ the immaterial aspect of our Self which has an 
experience of being in the world but which also is somehow separate from the world. 
Merleau-Ponty: A New Ground for Experience 
It was precisely this notion of a transcendental ego which French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected in responding to Husserl’s work. It 
was, instead, the body as subject, our physical selves which Merleau-Ponty saw as central 
to our experience of existing in the world. It is our physical existence which allows for 
the possibility of contact with the lifeworld, of interaction between others, and ourselves. 
Where Husserl saw the which does the experiencing as an transcendental ego, 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 41-42. 
Ibid., 45. 
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Merleau-Ponty argued that our most basic experience of the world is a physical one, that 
our bodies are merely a part of a larger body which is the world around us: the fabric of 
the lifeworld. To clarify what he means by the marriage of our bodies to the world, 
Merleau-Ponty uses the word Flesh in the collective sense. He writes: 
That means that my body is made of the same flesh as the world (it is a 
perceived), and moreover that this flesh of my body is shared by the world, 
the world reflects it, encroaches upon it and it encroaches upon the world 
(the felt [senti] at the same time the culmination of subjectivity and the 
culmination of materiality), they are in a relation of transgression or of 
overlapping.'^ 
This shift in focus, from the transcendental aspect of our experience of the world 
to the material, or sensual, experience of the world, means that it is our physical being 
which grounds us in the lifeworld. In other words, we are merely one part of a larger, 
organic, physical whole. Merleau-Ponty argues further that if that is indeed the case, then 
“our existence as sonorous beings for others and for ourselves contain everything required 
for there to be speech from one to the other, speech about the world.”It was Husserl’s 
goal to ground both philosophy and the sciences in a science of experience^ but as Abram 
has argued, Merleau-Ponty has provided a more useful ground by rejecting Husserl’s 
notion of a transcendental ego. 
Whereas Husserl, in spite of his comments on the character of our bodily 
experience, uses the ‘ego’ as a ground for our sense of self Merleau-Ponty grounds our 
sense of self in our bodily experience of the world. In this view, as we will see, 
differences between both individual and cultural perspectives arise as a result of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The Visible and the Invisible, Trans., Alphonso Lingis, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 248. 
Ibid., 155. 
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differences between their particular relationships with the larger, organic whole. In regard 
to this bodily grounding in the world, Merleau-Ponty argues: 
All my knowledge of the world [my world view], even my scientific 
knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some 
experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be 
meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon the world as 
directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous 
scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we 
must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world, of which 
1 7 
science is the second-order expression... 
Science is concerned with the facts of the world, such as the composition of 
objects or the mechanisms which determine the behaviour of those objects, but our 
relationship to those objects is also a part of our experience of reality. Science contributes 
only in part to our understanding of objects, as science is itself “built upon the world as 
directly experienced.” How we feel about certain sights, sounds and textures, like the 
howling of wolves, the delicate and intricate beauty we see in a spider’s web, and the awe 
one might feel while looking into the night sky all add greatly to the meaning the world 
holds for each of us; and for each of us that meaning is different. The meaning things 
have for us does not simply correspond to the scientific facts about those things, but 
rather, things take on meaning in relation to the whole history of our subjective and 
intersubjective experiences. 
In rejecting Husserl’s transcendental tendencies Merleau-Ponty argues instead that 
there is a reciprocal relationship between the sensuous, physical landscape and our 
physical bodies. We touch and are touched by the world. In other words, Merleau-Ponty 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception, Trans., Colin Smith, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1962), viii. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
Ibid., viii. 
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is arguing that it is our physical selves and not our subjective perceptions which ground 
us in the lifeworld. Moreover, it is this reciprocal relationship which makes possible not 
only our scientific ideas but language itself. Contemporary analytic philosopher Donald 
Davidson’s views on language and meaning are particularly relevant here. Davidson also 
holds that language and the world are “part of a single conceptual scheme...”'^, and that 
“[tjhought itself depends upon other people and the events we share in the world.” 
Davidson rejects the sort of simplistic referential theories of meaning, or correspondence 
theories of meaning, espoused by earlier philosophers such as Gottlob Frege and the early 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (though Wittgenstein did eventually abandon his 
correspondence theory).^* That is not to say, as we shall see, that Davidson completely 
rules out the importance of the notion of correspondence for his own theory of 
interpretation. 
Simon Evnine, in his book Donald Davidson, writes that according to Davidson’s 
theory of “holistic and normative theory of radical interpretation... the meaning of a 
sentence depends on its relations to other sentences, and those relations must, by and 
large, be those of consistency, coherence, and rationality.” In other words, unlike the 
Baird and Kaufmann. ‘Introduction’ to “The Method of Truth in Metaphysics” by Donald Davidson, in 
Twentieth Century Philosophy, E. Baird and W. Kaufmann, Eds., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1997), 328. 
Ibid., 329. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
See: P. Geach and M. Black, eds. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege 
(Philosophical Library, New York, 1952); and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961). 
Simon Evnine. Donald Davidson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 140. The italics are my 
own. 
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correspondence view of truth where the meaning of a sentence depends on its relation to 
the world, in “a coherence theory, this link with the world is lost.”^^ Evnine argues: 
Davidson’s theory of interpretation thus appears to face the same 
problem as the coherence theory of truth. It can either guarantee that the 
mere agreement generated by the Principle of Charity suffices for 
objective truth (and not just truth according to the interpreter) by 
identifying truth with (some form of) agreement.... Or else, it allows that 
truth exceeds mere agreement, in which case interpretation, and the 
coherence and consistency it brings, do not ensure that what is agreed 
upon is objectively true. In order, therefore, to answer the skeptical 
challenge, Davidson has to show ‘that coherence yields correspondence’ 
(1983, p. 307),...^“’ 
The problem here, simply stated, is that if the truth of a sentence depends on its 
coherence with other sentences in a particular theory or worldview, then there is no 
guarantee that sentences (or theories) are true beyond that theory or worldview. The 
problem is that if there is nothing beyond, or beneath, these larger theories (about which 
they can be correct or incorrect), then there is no frame of reference for determining the 
truth or falsity of any particular theory or worldview. However, it seems as though the 
lifeworld, which, as both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty argue, underlies all our diverse 
individual and cultural perspectives on the world, might provide the link which Davidson 
9 S requires in order to demonstrate the claim “that coherence yields correspondence.” 
Individual sentences are meaningful in that they are coherent within a particular theory or 
worldview. But what of those larger theories or world views themselves? According to 
Ibid., 140. 
Ibid., 141. Cf., Donald Davidson. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, reprinted in E. 
Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 307-319. 
Donald Davidson. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, reprinted in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth 
and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 
307. 
40 
Johnson, “what we have from the point of phenomenology, are not different worlds, but 
innumerable perspective on one world,” a phenomenological lifeworld. Moreover, the 
correspondence we are looking for is not the kind which the early Wittgenstein sought to 
establish: the isomorphic relationship (between language and the world) upon which his 
referential, or picture theory, of language relied. Our intimate participation in, or the fact 
of our being intimately woven into the fabric of, the animate terrain of the lifeworld (with 
all its sounds, smells and textures) not only makes possible speech and language, but also 
serves as the ground, or frame of reference, for the larger theories or cultural perspectives 
we construct in the attempt to make the lifeworld meaningful to ourselves. In other 
words, it is to this phenomenological lifeworld which larger theories and cultural 
perspectives ultimately correspond, including, our most sophisticated modem scientific 
theories. 
For Merleau-Ponty, that larger context is the physical landscape, the Flesh of the 
world, to which we are intimately connected. He writes that the “whole universe of 
science is built upon the world as directly experienced.” The world we know is the one 
we construct for ourselves, and how we construct and talk about that world is shaped by 
our physical and perceptual experience of it. An ongoing dynamic of reciprocity exists 
between ourselves and the Flesh of the world. 
Philosophically, what follows from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological project is 
that worldviews can be understood as providing cohesion to both our bodily and our 
subjective experience of a lifeworld which underlies all our various cultural perspectives. 
Johnson, Being and Race, 44. 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, viii. 
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It is not a question of establishing an exact correspondence between our views and the 
world as it is in itself. For example, just as a house has more meaning to me than just the 
shelter it provides from the elements, i.e., how it feels as a home, what the world in 
general means to us is more than just the totality of the scientific facts about it. For some 
people the world inspires great awe, they see tantalizing possibilities all around them. To 
others the world might feel cold or hostile, seeing only cruelty and indifference around 
them. Subjective experiences, such as the ones I have just mentioned, serve an integral 
role in shaping our views on such things as whether or not there is a creator, or whether or 
not to view animals as other-than-human persons which are deserving of our respect. 
Given the depth of the links between language, the land (or the Flesh of the 
world) and our perception, or experience of the world, examining the relationships 
between these various factors is of paramount importance. In order to see how different 
cultures perceive the world we must develop some degree of access to their worldview, or 
general theory of the world. Understanding the other’s worldview requires, in turn, an 
understanding of the historical relationship between all of the factors which helped 
shaped that culture’s unique perspective. Both David Abram and Walter Ong put forward 
arguments which resonate with Merleau-Ponty’s argument that language is rooted in 
peoples’ contact with the physical landscape in which they centrally find themselves. 
Abram and Ong: Orality, Literacy, and the Lifeworld 
In The Spell of the Sensuous Abram’s overriding concern is with the increasing 
alienation from nature which is typical of science based. Western cultures. This alienation 
which he discusses parallels, in an important way, the dissociation from physical reality 
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which Merleau-Ponty saw and rejected in Husserl’s notion of a transcendental ego (that 
we are fundamentally mental beings and ultimately separable from physical reality). 
Individuals from science based, Western cultures have, in a sense, forgotten that they are 
of the same flesh as the world. Abram, too, sees that mainstream Western society has lost 
touch with the physical landscape. A question which Abram dedicates a considerable 
amount of time to discussing in The Spell of the Sensuous is: “how did civilized 
humankind lose all sense of reciprocity and relationship with the animate natural world, 
that rapport that so influences (and limits) the activities of most indigenous, tribal 
peoples?”^^ In answering this question, Abram argues that at the heart of this problem of 
alienation is the written, phonetic alphabet. 
During the course of his discussion he draws our attention to Socrates’ poignant 
and age-old reminder that writing should only “serve as a reminder to a reader who 
already knows those things that have been written.” In other words, Socrates was 
concerned about the power of the written text and its debilitating effects on human 
memory. Socrates saw many pitfalls in the technology of writing, just as Abram does. 
However, in no way does Abram want us to abandon the written word. 
Abram hopes to re-unite the written word with the magic and sensuality of the 
lifeworld, that realm which underscores both the written and the spoken word, which 
nourishes our sciences as well as our physical beings. In re-discovering this relationship 
we can begin to re-orient ourselves, our senses and thoughts, to the living landscape. At 
the outset of his book Abram reminds us that 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 137. 
^^Ibid., 114; Cf, Plato. Phaedrus, Trans., R. Hackforth, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed., Edith 
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Our bodies have formed themselves in delicate reciprocity with the 
manifold textures, sounds, and shapes of an animate earth - our eyes have 
evolved in subtle interaction with other eyes, as our ears are attuned by 
their very structure to the howling of wolves and the honking of geese.^^ 
The sights, sounds, smells, and tastes which are peculiar to different locales on 
earth have helped to shape the people of those areas in unique ways. How each of us 
grows and changes is intimately connected to our experiences with the physical, animate 
environment. Our senses are in continual contact with the world, touching and being 
touched. It is on these grounds that Abram argues: 
To the sensing body all phenomena are animate, actively soliciting the 
participation of our senses, or else withdrawing from our focus and 
repelling our involvement.... Each thing, each phenomenon, has the power 
to reach us and influence us.... Thus, at the most primordial level of 
sensuous, bodily experience, we find ourselves in an expressive, gesturing 
landscape, in a world that speaks f' 
In being confronted with this landscape we are forced to decipher our relationship 
with and understanding of this primordial experience of reality. We learn to echo its 
sounds, its grunts and whistles, and are shaped by its many other influences which we 
seek to make meaningful to ourselves. The sensual world, then, provides the tapestry of 
experiences, or the larger context, which underlies all our diverse languages and cultures. 
Abram argues that what this means for oral cultures such as the many varied North 
American Indigenous cultures, is that: 
In the absence of phonetic literacy, neither society, nor language, nor even 
the experience of thought or consciousness, can be pondered in isolation 
from the multiple nonhuman shapes and powers that lend their influence to 




It is Abram’s contention that the written, phonetic alphabet has facilitated a 
radical development in human communication. Writing allowed thought (and textual 
communication) to move beyond the context of the physical landscape. Thought and 
communication were no longer limited to the context of our everyday lived experiences. 
Citing numerous historical examples, he contends that along with the shift to the phonetic 
alphabet our senses also underwent a shift of their own. The once mysterious and animate 
landscape (with all its rich contours and textures) which had engaged our senses was 
replaced by the sterility and flatness of the written page. Moreover, Abram draws our 
attention to the fact that the letters of the alphabet no longer carried with them their 
connection to the phenomena in nature which inspired their development. He notes such 
examples as the letter ‘a’ which originated from the ancient Semitic aleph-beth (as its 
first letter, aleph: 1/ ), which “is also the ancient Hebrew word for ‘ox’. The shape of the 
letter, as we can see, was that of an ox’s head with horns; turned over, it became our own 
letter^.”’’ The effects of this separation, or dis-association, of letters (and, eventually, 
words) from their natural referents have pervaded most, if not all, aspects of literate 
peoples’ consciousness. Abram writes: 
Only by training the senses to participate with the written word could one 
hope to break their spontaneous participation with the animate terrain. 
Only as the written text began to speak would the voices of the forest, and 
of the river, begin to fade. And only then would language loosen its 
ancient association with the invisible breath, the spirit sever itself from the 
wind, the psyche dissociate itself from the environing air?^ 
Ibid., 101. 
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Today, in Western mainstream society, this ancient association is all but a distant 
memory. Written, phonetic languages, such as English, no longer reflect the formative 
influences of the living landscape on literate peoples’ ways of thinking and perceiving. 
The connection between our words and the living landscape has been severed. It is this 
alienation from the natural world which now underlies Western thought processes. In 
their article “Transformative Philosophy and Indigenous Thought: A Comparison of 
Lakota and Ojibwa World Views”, McPherson and Rabb comment on Abram’s 
conclusions: 
This profoundly detached view of ‘nature’ is, of course, the one which 
many of us still unthinkingly presuppose today. That is why we fail to fully 
comprehend indigenous world views such as those of the Lakota and 
Ojibwa. That is the root of the incommensurability problem. With 
difficulty it can be overcome. The whole point of Abram’s book is to 
overcome it.^^ 
A key point which I would like to draw attention to here is that this profoundly 
detached view of nature is unthinkingly presupposed. This presupposition is a product of 
the structure of language (and in particular, languages such as English). In general, how 
and what we think is governed by the language we speak. Suppositions such as this 
detached view of nature are made explicit only when the structures of language itself are 
brought under examination. Rupert Ross (an Assistant Crown Attorney in northwestern 
Ontario) presents an example, in his book Returning to the Teachings: Exploring 
Aboriginal Justice, which demonstrates very well the unthought presuppositions of 
languages. After three years of interviews with Indigenous peoples from numerous 
communities Ross notes that they “describe their verb-world as one where each person’s 
Dennis McPherson and J. Douglas Rabb. “Transformative Philosophy and Indigenous Thought: A 
Comparison of Lakota and Ojibwa World Views” Papers of the Twenty-Ninth Algonquian Conference, 
David H. Pentland, Ed., (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1999), 209. 
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primary focus is not on each separate thing but on all the movements and relationships 
between things.Ross goes on to describe the impact of these different languages on 
how speakers of these different languages view the justice system: 
For instance, when we thought of a “justice system,” our Western-trained, 
“thing-searching” eyes saw only offences - long lists of them, all precisely 
defined, all subdivided according to their seriousness. We then treated 
those lists as if they were the justice system.... As soon as you being to 
look at the justice system through “process-searching” eyes, however, it 
shows itself as a collection of four processes through which those 
offences, and the people who committed them, are manoeuvered.^^ 
The four processes Ross describes are: 1) the bail process, 2) the plea-discussion 
process, 3) the trial process, and 4) the sentencing process?^ Adopting a process-based 
approach to the justice system, Ross argues, “seems to offer ways of avoiding some of 
the problems that will continue to plague us as long as we stay with an offence-based 
approachNoting that a large portion of cases in Canada are resolved through guilty 
pleas rather than through trials, he argues that it is the first three processes which he 
describes that are involved in most people’s experience of the justice system. The number 
of guilty pleas could be increased (which would further reduce the number of trials), he 
argues, “if the courts support healing processes as alternatives to jail or fmes.”'^^ Viewing 
the justice system as process-based rather than an offence-based system will allow 
Rupert Ross. Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1996), 
239. 
Ibid., 239. 
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40 Ibid., 240. 
47 
Western culture to accommodate Native communities’ demands for increased 
involvement in the justice system, such as the ability to impose alternative, culturally 
appropriate sentences. The point here, he argues, is not to perpetuate Native peoples’ 
inclusion in the Western justice system, but that “those processes can be dramatically 
improved by anyone’s standard, by gaining strong aboriginal involvement. Once 
communities become involved in these matters, they can more easily shift from them into 
strictly healing processes instead.”"^^ In other words, a shift to a justice system which is 
more in keeping with the verb-world in which Native people see themselves participating. 
Walter Ong’s Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word is concerned 
with how the technology of writing has shaped, and continues to shape, literate peoples’ 
ways of thinking and perceiving, and how they communicate those thoughts and 
perceptions. Understanding the influences the technology of writing has had on literate 
peoples might also aid in our attempts to understand the difficulties which are faced by 
Western people in attempting to gain access to the worldviews of cultures rooted in oral 
traditions. I look to Ong’s work at this point for two important discussions he presents. 
These discussions help us to understand, in an important way, how the nature of both the 
spoken and written word have shaped oral and literate peoples’ use of language, 
respectively. Moreover, in familiarizing ourselves with the effects of writing and orality 
on how people use language, we can begin to better understand the unique ways oral and 
literate peoples use particular concepts, including, of course, the concept of autonomy, the 
principal focus of this study. 
41 Ibid., 241. 
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As a preliminary note I should clarify that, like Abram, Ong is not in favour of 
abandoning written tradition. Rather, the point he seems to be making is that in becoming 
more aware of the profound changes which writing has brought with it we can both 
understand those changes more fully and ensure that these changes do not go unchecked. 
In discussing the relationship between orality, literacy, and human consciousness Ong 
argues, first of all, that in the case of oral cultures the “restriction of words to sound [as 
opposed to the visualness of the written word] determines not only modes of expression 
but also thought processes.He argues in respect to literate cultures that: 
Without writing, the literate mind would not and could not think as it does, 
not only when engaged in writing but normally even when it is composing 
its thoughts in oral form. More than any other single technology, writing 
has transformed human consciousness."^^ 
In other words, oral and written traditions each shape humanity’s reasoning 
processes in their own way. The technology of writing has allowed for what Ong refers to 
as a context-free language. This realm of context-free language has thus become the 
background which must be given consideration when deciphering the use of any 
particular concept by literate peoples. For example, any attempt by Indigenous peoples at 
understanding Western philosophers’ use of such concepts as space and time must take 
into consideration this context-free language which has helped shaped Western 
philosophers’ articulation of these concepts. 
Ong’s arguments also help us to understand Meyer and Ramirez’s claim that: 
“Coming to understand another world view is Teaming how to reason’ in the style of the 
Walter Ong. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge, 1989), 33. The 
addition in square brackets is my own. 
Ibid., 78. 
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other world view.”'^'^ Given the profound effects of writing on human consciousness it 
seems that understanding ‘how to reason’ in the style of the other requires that we 
examine the role orality and literacy play in shaping human thought processes. Ong 
argues outrightly that: “More than any other single invention, writing has transformed 
human consciousness.”"^^ Generally speaking, Ong’s point is that this context-free 
language which writing allows for has resulted in a characteristic detachment from the 
natural world among literate cultures. It is the text (the written words themselves) which 
the reader now directly engages and not the author of those words. The senses of literate 
peoples have undergone a shift from being attuned to the sensual phenomena of the 
physical landscape to the written word. Abram argues: “There is [in literate cultures] a 
concerted shift of our attention away from any outward or worldly reference of the 
pictorial image, away from the sensible phenomena that had previously called forth the 
spoken utterance, to the shape of the utterance itself, now invoked directly by the written 
character.In contrasting written and verbal discourse, Ong writes: “real speech and 
thought always exist essentially in a context of give-and-take between real persons. 
Writing is passive, out of it, in an unreal, unnatural world. 
Leroy Meyer and Tony Ramirez. “Wakinyan Hotan: The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of 
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Cultural Perspectives and the Concepts of Space and Time 
The technology of writing has served to restructure basic aspects of human 
consciousness and, thus, human perception as well. Two basic human experiences which 
writing has affected, Ong argues, are our experience and understanding of the concepts of 
space and time. Abram, too, looks to the concepts of space and time in order to illustrate 
his argument that the written, phonetic alphabet has been a central factor in the alienation 
of people from their natural surroundings, the sort of alienation which has become 
characteristic of Western mainstream society. I include these examples in my study in 
order to demonstrate the lack of understanding between Native and non-Native peoples 
which results from such fundamentally disparate uses of language, such as oral and 
written traditions. In other words, the following discussion regarding the concepts of 
space and time is intended to illustrate not only how writing has restructured literate 
peoples’ consciousness, but how this re-shaping of literate peoples’ consciousness has 
made it very difficult, seemingly impossible in some cases, for Native and non-Native 
people to engage in meaningful communication with each other. 
As for the concept of space, Ong argues that it is the technology of writing which 
has made possible the notion of abstract, absolute space, a notion which plays 
prominently in the evolution of the consciousness of literate peoples. One of the results of 
this evolution of consciousness, he argues, is a “growth in explicit philosophical concern 
with the self, which becomes noticeable in Kant”. In regard to the effect of writing on 
the literate mind’s perception of space, Ong writes: 
Ibid., 178. 
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By removing words from the world of sound where they had first had 
their origin in active human interchange and relegating them definitely to 
visual surface, and by otherwise exploiting visual space for the 
management of knowledge, print encouraged human beings to think of 
their own interior conscious and unconscious resources as more and more 
thing-like, impersonal and religiously neutral. Print encouraged the mind 
to sense that its possessions were held in some sort of inert mental space."^^ 
Abram, too, recognizes the impact of print on human consciousness. He argues 
that it was the accelerated spread of written texts, made possible through the invention of 
the printing press, which allowed the effects of the written word to spread through the 
general population of Europe. Prior to the printing press, he argues, a “thorough 
differentiation of ‘time’ and ‘space’ was impossible as long as large portions of the 
community experienced the surroundings as animate and alive, as long as material 
(spatial) phenomena were still perceived by many as having their own inherent 
spontaneity and (temporal) dynamism.”^® 
In contrast to the orality of both North American Indigenous cultures and the early 
European oral traditions, writing allowed for what Abram describes as “the dominion of 
alphabetic reason over a natural world increasingly construed as a passive and mechanical 
set of objects.”^* In other words, nature no longer had to be directly present for it to be 
thought about; the permanence of the written word provided the illusion of a realm of 
ideas/concepts which could be considered in isolation from the objects which they 
represent. Abram argues that “only when a qualitative term is written down does it 
52 become ponderable as a fixed form independent of both the speakers and of situations.” 
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It is in this way, then, that the concepts of space and time became a source of 
inquiry and heated debate among European scholars. However, it was not the everyday 
bodily experience of space which scholars were concerned with. Their focus was the idea 
of space itself, that empty void which was thought to be leftover if all the objects which 
filled it could be removed. After centuries of debate, renown philosopher Immanuel Kant 
took up these ideas in his Critique of Pure Reason. In regard to space, Kant writes: 
“Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences.” For 
Kant, space was, generally speaking, a property or aspect of mind, or as Kant says: “By 
means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside 
of us, and all without exception in space.Space is not necessarily a property of things 
in themselves. In other words, Kant’s arguments lead to the possibility that the world 
does not, in itself, possess the property of spatiality. He argued instead that it was the 
perceiver who brought the appearance of spatiality to his or her experience. In fact, Kant 
refers to both space and time as sensible forms of intuition and goes so far as to conclude 
that space “must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, 
and not as a determination dependent on them.”^^ In commenting on Kant’s arguments, 
Abram writes: 
Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, Trans., Norman Kemp Smith, (London: MacMillan Press, 
1993), B38. 
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Kant’s work seemed to establish more forcefully than ever that, at least as 
far as humans were concerned, ‘space’ and ‘time’ were distinct and 
inescapable dimensions. 
Needless to say, Kant’s writings could not be translated into 
Navajo or Pintupi.'^ 
The difficulties faced here result from the dramatic differences between each of 
these culture’s notions of space and time. In Kant’s writings, space is understood as 
something which our minds add to our experience of the world. The concept of spatiality 
is something we add to our experience of the world and not something which is derived 
from our experience of the world. However, in oral cultures, the understanding of space is 
one which is connected with, or derived from, an experience of the world. Space is 
understood as a sense of place, not as some abstract notion which can be pared away from 
our particular experiences of the world. Moreover, the differences here must also be 
viewed in connection with oral and literate culture’s understanding of time, because, as 
we have seen, the meaning, or use, of any particular concept cannot be fully understood in 
isolation from other concepts. In Meyer and Ramirez’ words, we must take into 
consideration the “network of inferential associations”^^ which exist between concepts in 
any particular worldview. 
In regard to oral and literate peoples’ differing notions of time, Ong argues that, 
prior to the advent of writing, or at least its thorough adoption by Europe’s general 
populace, and the use of European calendrical systems, “people did not feel themselves 
situated every moment of their lives in abstract computed time of any sort.” A 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 201. 
Meyer and Ramirez, “Wakinyan Hotan: The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of 
Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics”, 92 
Ong, Orality and Literacy, 97. 
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Straightforward reason which Ong offers as support for this claim is that the “abstract 
calendar number would relate to nothing in real life.”^^ Time, prior to the popularization 
of writing and print in Europe, was perceived as a very natural phenomenon. The passage 
of time was indicated by the cycles of Nature, the coming and going of seasons, the 
regular, and sometimes irregular, cycles of the bodies which fill the sky, and the onset of 
aging; hours and minutes were meaningless. However, with the advent of writing the 
passage of time could be divided into increments and its passage carefully recorded as 
moving forward from an arbitrary, yet fixed, moment in time, e.g., the birth of Christ. 
Calvin L. Martin’s In the Spirit of the Earth: Rethinking History and Time deals 
extensively with this contrived sense of time. Discussing ancient peoples’ need, or desire, 
to master such things as agriculture, i.e., the timing of the planting and harvesting crops, 
Martin notes that it was the discovery of celestial time that facilitated this mastery. He 
comments on this newly acquired sense of quantifiable time, writing: 
The priests who figured this out must have sensed themselves ushered into 
the presence of the almighty beings. It was verily a “fall out of nature into 
knowledge,” maybe the Fall that damns us all: bewitched by time.... 
Time’s arrow - the cosmic monster that has proved itself infinitely more 
terrifying than any projectile ever devised by the paleolithic imagination.^^ 
Prior to this contrived sense of time, success in agricultural matters (as well as in 
animal husbandry) was largely attributed to “plant and animal volition, plant and animal 
permission.”^* This early, animistic approach, however, did not ensure any sort of success 
in these matters. For these early peoples, Martin argues, “the secret to the riddle of plant 
Ibid., 98. 
Calvin Luther Martin. In the Spirit of the Earth: Rethinking History and Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
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and animal production and reproduction was timing: time, which became a clock.”^^ In 
this way, then, another aspect of the natural world could be objectified, or measured out. 
It was objectifications such as these which allowed for such colloquial sayings as ‘having 
spare time’. Moreover, the writing down of past and future moments in time seems to 
have given them a reality of their own, thus adding support to the perceived reality of 
abstract, linear time. 
The differences between senses of time in oral and literate cultures can be looked 
at on two levels. The first is an ordinary sense of time, and the second is a larger overall 
sense of time (which shapes oral and literate cultures’ notion of ordinary time). The 
everyday sense of time for oral cultures, commonly referred to as cyclical time, is 
grounded in the direct experience of movements of the lifeworld, for example, the cycle 
of the seasons. There are, of course, exceptions such as the Aztec and Mayan cultures of 
South America which developed sophisticated calendrical systems, allowing for an 
increased sense of abstract time, a development which was quite possibly one factor in 
the downfall of these once prosperous civilizations. 
Like oral cultures, there is also, in literate cultures, an ordinary sense of time 
which is divided in to past, present, and future, for example, the sense that yesterday was 
Monday, today is Tuesday, and tomorrow will be Wednesday, a chronology of days and 
weeks. However, this ordinary sense of time for literate cultures contrasts with that of 
oral culture in that it is not derived solely from a lived experience of the world. Instead, 
ordinary notions of time in literate societies are grounded in larger abstract notions of 
time, for example, the abstract notions of time which were argued for by both Kant and 
62 Ibid., 57. 
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Newton (although, it should be noted that their notions of time are substantially 
different). Abram writes that for Newton absolute time is “an independent reality that we 
cannot perceive directly, but which underlies all material events and their relations. 
Ordinary time, in oral cultures, is also rooted in a larger sense of time. However, this 
larger sense of time is not viewed as being independent of lived reality. This larger sense 
of time might usefully be described as the sense of an ever-present ‘here and now’, to 
which we are intimately connected. Abram provides a characterization of this larger sense 
of time. He writes: 
When I allow the past and the future to dissolve, imaginatively, into the 
immediacy of the present moment, then the ‘present’ itself expands to 
become an enveloping field of presence. And this presence, vibrant and 
alive, spontaneously assumes the precise shape and contour of the 
enveloping landscape, as though it were its native shape 
This larger sense of time not only shapes the ordinary sense of time experienced in 
oral cultures, but is also intimately connected with the sense of space which is found in 
oral cultures. In literate cultures, a larger sense of time also shapes the ordinary sense of 
time, but this larger sense of time (and space as well) is, in contrast to oral cultures, 
understood as being independent of ordinary reality. Moreover, space and time, in literate 
cultures, are also understood as being distinct from each other. In other words, the notions 
of space and time which arise in oral and literate cultures are, fundamentally, at odds with 
each other. It is on these grounds then that Abram argues that Kant’s notions of space and 
time could not be translated into either Navajo or Pintupi. Any attempt at some sort of 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 200. 
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cross-cultural, philosophical discussion about space and time is severely hindered by 
these drastically different cultural perspectives. 
Abram’s point, in general, is that it was specifically the written, phonetic alphabet 
which made possible this shift from the examination of the everyday sensual experience 
of space and time to the consideration of space and time as abstract objects of thought. 
Moreover, he contends that it was not merely our experience of space and time which was 
affected, but that a more pervasive, more general overall alienation from the whole of the 
natural world has resulted from the adoption of phonetic writing: an alienation from our 
Mother Earth. To reiterate, Abram’s claim is that it is the written, phonetic alphabet 
which has facilitated 1) Western culture’s alienation from the natural world, and 2) a 
view of nature as simply a resource which has the sole purpose of servicing mankind’s 
needs. However, the importance of this alienation is not limited to the concepts of space 
and time. These differences between oral and literate peoples’ formulations of the 
concepts of space and time are indicative of differences in the overall perspectives of oral 
and literate peoples which have, in turn, led to the sort of incommensurability which is 
central to the present day conflicts between Western and Indigenous cultures here in 
North America. 
Moving Beyond the Incommensurability Problem 
In light of these fundamental differences between oral and literate cultures, the 
question which remains is: how are we to resolve, or move beyond, this sort of 
incommensurability? The key to the solution, Abram argues, is understanding our 
participation in the lifeworld which underlies all our diverse cultural perspectives. Karen 
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A'Llerio, in her recent Master’s thesis. Craft, Ritual, and World View: Ojibwa Ontology 
through Transformative Philosophy, looks to Abram’s discussion of the lifeworld in his 
The Spell of the Sensuous in the hope that it will “provide a common ground both literally 
and philosophically”^^ for “understand[ing] the meaning of Ojibwa crafted objects.”^^ 
A’Llerio writes: 
If, however. Western and Native people share a common life-world, how 
can our perceptions, organization, and interaction with it be so different - 
to the point of incommensurability? Abram responds to this apparent 
dilemma by explaining: 
It should be evident that the life-world may be quite different for different cultures. 
The world that a people experiences and comes to count on is deeply influenced 
by the ways they live and engage that world. The members of any given culture 
necessarily inhabit an experienced world very different from that of another 
culture with a very language and way of life.... And yet, despite this multiplicity, it 
would seem that there are basic structures to the life-world that are shared, 
elements that are common to different cultures and even, we may suspect, to 
different species... (41-42) 
Therefore, what appears as incommensurability is such because we have 
not looked deeply enough. We have been seeking understanding between 
cultural life-worlds, without seeking our commonalities at the deeper life- 
world level. 
In other words, it is our shared participation in the lifeworld which opens up the 
possibility of mutual comprehensibility in cross-cultural contexts. This failure to look 
deeply enough into this common ground has severely hampered Western peoples’ 
understanding of Indigenous peoples’ use of such Western concepts as autonomy. 
Developing an understanding of this mutual participation in the lifeworld provides us 
with a means of responding to the following question which is posed by McPherson and 
Rabb: “what is it about literate cultures rooted in Western European civilization which 
Karen A’Llerio. “Craft, Ritual, and World View: Ojibwa Ontology through Transformative Philosophy” 
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makes it difficult for their people to come to grips with the indigenous oral traditions of 
North America?”^^ 
Ong, following his own extended discussion of the effects of the technology of 
writing on human consciousness, makes what might best be described as a disclaimer, 
stating: “To say that a great many changes in the psyche and in culture connect with the 
passage from orality to writing is not to make writing (and/or its sequel, print) the sole 
cause of all the changes.”^^ Though this may indeed be the case, it is my contention that 
when it comes to pursuing solutions to the seemingly radical incommensurability (and the 
resulting misunderstanding and conflict) which has resulted from the differences between 
cultures rooted in oral and written traditions, it is precisely the effects of the technology 
of writing which must be brought under close scrutiny. So, even though writing has 
brought with it, and opened up, many invaluable possibilities for humankind, the 
technology of writing also involves a corresponding set of dangers, namely, the danger of 
losing touch with the foundation, or ground, which we are ultimately striving to 
understand though the power of language: our intimate connection with the sensual 
lifeworld. A delicate balance must be maintained. Neither the technology of writing nor 
the spontaneous reciprocity present in oral cultures can be wholly abandoned. Achieving 
such a balance is precisely Abram’s point when he declares: "'Our task, rather, is that of 
taking up the written word, with all its potency, and patiently, carefully, writing language 
back into the land''^^ 
McPherson and Rabb, “Transformative Philosophy and Indigenous Thought”, 207. The italics are my 
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Cross-Cultural Relations and the Notion of Dissociation 
In our present circumstance these changes in the evolution of human 
consciousness have been shaping the minds of literate peoples in gradual and, hence, 
almost imperceptible ways, for over two thousand years. It is no wonder that we are faced 
with the lack of understanding which has developed between oral and literate cultures, 
and specifically, such relationships as those between North American Indigenous cultures 
and the mainstream Western populace. 
Ian Hacking, in Representing and Intervening, presents a discussion regarding the 
subtle changes which theories undergo over time. These changes lead to what Hacking 
describes as a sense of dissociation, or radical incommensurability; and it is a notion 
which both Meyer and Ramirez and McPherson and Rabb have found useful for 
understanding the process of distancing between oral and literate cultures. One instance 
of the usefulness Hacking’s notion of dissociation can be seen in McPherson and Rabb’s 
examination of systemic discrimination against Indigenous people in the Western 
education system. In regard to these subtle changes which theories under go over long 
periods of time, Hacking argues that a “long enough time, and radical enough shifts in 
theory, may make earlier work unintelligible to a later scientific audience.”^' 
Although Hacking focuses his attention on the development of and changes 
between scientific theories within the history of European traditions, his arguments are, 
nonetheless, well suited to my present discussion. In fact, his arguments serve very well 
Ian Hacking. Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983), 69. 71 
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for clarifying and expanding on both Abram’s phonetic alphabet thesis and Ong’s orality 
- literacy arguments. Hacking wTites: 
An old theory may be forgotten, but still be intelligible to the modem 
reader who is willing to spend the time relearning it. On the other hand 
some theories indicate so radical a change that one requires something far 
harder than mere learning of a new theory. 
Two points interest me here. The first is the ‘radical change’ which Hacking 
mentions. The advent of writing, as we have seen, has been an central factor in inducing 
precisely such radical changes in theories. The technology of writing has allowed for 
radical developments in theories in all facets of the cultures of literate peoples, from 
ethical theories to economic theories. The second point which interests me here is the 
‘something far harder’ which Hacking states is required. In his article “Language, Tmth 
and Reason” Hacking makes a very important admission. He writes: “I do admit that 
there is a real phenomenon of disparate ways of thinking. Some styles of reasoning have 
become so firmly displaced that we cannot even recognize their objects.It is here that I 
return to the different styles of reasoning which Meyer and Ramirez discussed. Meyer and 
Ramirez make use of Hacking’s work, arguing that the inability of people rooted in 
Western tradition “to understand the essence of Lakota/Dakota metaphysics can be 
understood to derive from a specific kind of incommensurability that Ian Hacking... has 
called dissociation.”^"^ The problem, simply stated, is that “missionaries misinterpreted 
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the metaphysical significance of the traditional Dakota/Lakota culture.The problem 
was not missionaries’ inability to understand particular words but rather the overall, or 
collective, significance of those words. Native utterances were interpreted in terms of the 
missionaries’ own particular Western ‘way of reasoning’. The result was a 
misrepresentation of Dakota/Lakota thought. Therefore, Meyer and Ramirez argue: 
“Understanding this problem will enable us to be more discriminating in considering the 
interpretive descriptions of Lakota/Dakota world view presented within literature, law 
and social science. 
Their point (and Hacking’s as well) is that gaining access to different worldviews 
involves more than simple translation. It requires the more difficult process of learning to 
reason according the overall framework of another worldview. The changes in the literate 
mind’s consciousness which have been induced by the technology of writing have led to 
just such a difference in ‘styles of reasoning’. These changes which the written word have 
brought about have, thus, made it immensely difficult for literate peoples to gain access to 
the styles of reasoning of oral cultures, or even to recognize them as forms of reasoning. 
The expansion of the technology of writing has involved a dissociation from our 
“spontaneous participation with the animate terrain.Possibly even more importantly, 
the technology of writing has also brought about profound changes in human 
consciousness. These changes have, according to Ong’s line of reasoning, resulted in a 
dissociation from a communal sense of self This communal sense of self grounded in 
Ibid., 93. 
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one’s participation with the myriad communities of an animate landscape, was replaced 
by a more individual sense of self based, instead, on an abstract notion of a mental 
substance which transcends the physical landscape. Ong writes that. 
The evolution of consciousness through human history is marked by 
growth in articulate attention to the interior of the person as distanced - 
though not necessarily separated from - the communal structures in which 
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each person is necessarily enveloped. 
This process of distancing has led to not only a dissociation from both the natural 
world and a fundamental (communal) sense of self, it has led, moreover, to a sense of 
dissociation from other persons. In terms of the lack of understanding which exists 
between Indigenous and Western cultures, this process of distancing has had a twofold 
effect. First, the abstract notion of mental substance has, in Western culture, led to a view 
of self as an individual ego which is understood (or defined) as being ultimately separate 
from other selves and objects. The net result of this notion of individual egos, in Western 
culture, has been a separation of individuals (from each other). The self is no longer 
understood in terms of its membership within a particular community, but rather in terms 
of its apparent isolation from others in being a fundamentally mental being, a Cartesian 
ego. 
Second, in understanding themselves as discrete mental entities, each of which is 
unique and distinct (and ultimately disconnected) from each and every other being, there 
has been a separation of individuals in Western culture from the comprehension of 
Indigenous communal societies: a distancing from what it means to define oneself in 
terms of one’s membership in various communities, including both human and other- 
than-human communities. Western people, generally speaking, move about, and relate to, 
Ong, Orality and Literacy, 178. 
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the world as an individual self which engages an immense and ultimately unknowable 
other, whereas Indigenous peoples view themselves as participating in a vast and varied 
set of communities which are discovered through actively developing relations within 
those communities. It is, in part, because of such differences as the way each of these 
different senses of self are grounded, that oral and literate peoples alike have experienced 
overwhelming difficulties in their attempts to understand each other’s cultural traditions. 
Stated simply, these difficulties have made living in the world together, or establishing a 
balanced relationship between the various cultural traditions which comprise our present 
global community, a very complicated affair. 
The usefulness of notions such as dissociation for examining and understanding 
cross-cultural relations has not only been demonstrated by Meyer and Ramirez in their 
paper “Wakinyan Hotan: The Thunder Beings Call Out: The Inscrutability of 
Lakota/Dakota Metaphysics”, but has also been echoed by McPherson and Rabb in their 
recent article “Walking the Talk: An Application of Anishnabe Philosophy or A Tearful 
Trail Toward Culturally Congruent Education”. In their article, McPherson and Rabb 
state that it is their intent to “use Ian Hacking’s notion of dissociation or radical 
79 incommensurability as a philosophical framework for understanding discrimination.” 
Their use of Hacking’s work in examining the issue of discrimination reflects, very 
clearly, controversial conclusions and calls to action that Benjamin Whorf presents in his 
essay “Language, Mind, and Reality”. Whorf writes: 
Dermis McPherson and J. Douglas Rabb. “Walking the Talk: An Application of Anishnabe Philosophy 
or A Tearful Trail toward Culturally Congruent Education” Ayaangwaamizin: The International Journal of 
Indigenous Philosophy 2: \ (1989-1999): 89-99. 
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Thus, one of the most important coming steps for Western knowledge is a 
re-evaluation of the linguistic backgrounds of its thinking, and for that 
matter of all thinking.^® 
This call to action involves a careful examination of the unthought 
presuppositions which have shaped, and which continue to shape. Western ways of 
thinking. McPherson and Rabb, for instance, are arguing that the Western attitudes which 
govern both the administration and content of educational institutions make it extremely 
difficult for such institutions to effectively respond to Native students’ needs. McPherson 
O 1 
and Rabb argue, in reference to “the attempt of Native people to be heard” in this 
context, that 
It follows that when a modern university administration attempts to 
understand what culturally appropriate education means to Native students 
without realizing that the entire non-Native world view may well be 
incommensurable with that of the students, the decisions reached may well 
result, not merely in misunderstanding, but in actual systemic 
discrimination. 
The attempt to adapt Western educational institutions to meet Native peoples’ 
needs must involve a re-evaluation, or re-thinking, of the attitudes which guide decisions 
regarding the content, delivery, and administration of education in Western academic 
institutions. However, this re-thinking of Western attitudes in not enough. The 
implementation of the kind of culturally appropriate education which McPherson and 
Rabb have in mind requires that educators and administrators develop a deeper 
understanding of Native peoples’ perspectives and needs. In other words, McPherson and 
Benjamin L. Whorf. “Language, Mind, and Reality”, reprinted in Language, Thought, and Reality: 
Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, Ed., John B. Carroll, (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1966), 
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Rabb are arguing that a “dissociation from their own Western world view is required,”^^ a 
re-orientation of thought and meaning. 
If it is the animate lifeworld which is at the basis of the meaningfulness of all 
these varied cultural perspectives, as has been argued throughout this chapter, then a 
recognition of that fact is the first step in reaching mutual understanding between the 
Indigenous people of North America and its Western settlers. Using this insight it is now 
possible to take one further step: an evaluation of the actual use of particular concepts. In 
terms of this study, this final step involves turning our attention to Indigenous peoples’ 
use of the concept of autonomy in articulating their desire for such things as self- 
government, and culturally appropriate education. 
83 Ibid., 92. 
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Cultural Perspectives in Applying Concepts 
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Two adaptations of Michael Pomedli’s method of conceptual archaeology 
provide the framework for my cross-cultural treatment of the concept of autonomy. 
Pomedli’s work involved examining material with obvious cultural biases (e.g., the Jesuit 
Relations), while taking into account these biases as best as possible in an attempt to gain 
a clearer understanding of the Huron people’s use of concepts which the Jesuits used as 
translations of their Christian concept of soul. My first adaptation of this methodology 
concerns Natives peoples’ appropriation of the Western term autonomy and the cultural 
biases (or worldviews) which serve as a context for Native peoples’ particular uses of this 
concept (as well as Indigenous interpretations of relevant arguments of Western 
philosophers). The aim of my second adaptation of Pomedli’s methodology is to take into 
consideration, or make allowances for, the Western cultural biases which have shaped, or 
limited, the use, or articulation, of the concept of autonomy by Western philosophers such 
as Immanuel Kant. 
Throughout this chapter I also make use of the arguments of George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson put forward in their recent book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied 
Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, concerning the role of metaphor, or use of 
conceptual metaphors, in reasoning within a particular conceptual framework. Their 
discussion aids in my attempt to demonstrate the possibility of circumventing the so 
called problem of incommensurability in that it provides a framework for understanding 
how cultural biases relate to the ways concepts are used within a particular worldview. 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphorical idioms '‘open up the possibility that a 
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significant part of the lexical differences across languages may have to do with 
differences in conventional imagery. The same metaphorical mappings applied to 
different images will give rise to different linguistic expressions of those mappings.”* 
One account of the concept of autonomy, in Western philosophy, comes to us 
through the work of Immanuel Kant. In the case of Indigenous peoples’ use of the word 
‘autonomy’ I have looked to a variety of materials in order to get at Indigenous 
perspectives on this concept. The first is the contemporary academic discourse of 
Indigenous peoples in journals such as Ayaangwaamizin: The International Journal of 
Indigenous Philosophy, books such as Robert A. Williams, Jr.’s Linking Arms Together: 
American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800, and government 
publications such as the British Columbia Ministry of Education’s Native Literacy and 
Life Skills Curriculum Guidelines. The second area includes anthropological materials 
such as Dorothy Lee’s Freedom and Culture. Lastly, I also look to insights contained in 
traditional materials of North American Indigenous peoples such as the Constitution of 
the Iroquois people as well as the Gus Wen Tah, a treaty belt of the Iroquois people. 
The concern which has led, in part, to my choice of the concept of autonomy for 
this study is the growing use of this Western word ‘autonomy’ by Indigenous peoples in 
connection with various social issues such as culturally appropriate education and self- 
government. My choice is also, in part, a response to the growing body of academic 
discourse put forward by Indigenous peoples, which McPherson and Rabb, for their own 
‘ Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York; Basic Books, 1999), 69. 
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part, describe as “a critique of Kantian ethics from a Native American perspective.”^ This 
body of discourse is, I argue, a valuable source of insights into not only Native peoples’ 
own understanding of the concept of autonomy, but also into Native peoples’ worldviews 
in general. Moreover, a critique from an Indigenous perspective provides an ‘outsider’s’ 
view of our Western philosophical uses of this concept from which we can learn much. 
In criticizing Kant, Native scholars have tended to emphasize the aspects of 
Kant’s work they dislike most. However, within an historical and social context, there is a 
sense of urgency among Indigenous peoples to re-assert the distinctness of their cultural 
heritage. I shall argue that this urgency is often accompanied by a tendency to simplify 
aspects of Western philosophy (or, at least, equate a particular philosopher’s use of a 
concept with its everyday use in Western mainstream society) in order to emphasize the 
differences between Western and Indigenous perspectives. 
Kant’s Use of the Concept of Autonomy 
In examining Kant’s use of the concept of autonomy it is important to look not 
only at his own words but also, according to Lakoff and Johnson, at some of the 
underlying factors which have shaped Kant’s own use of this concept. One factor which 
they point to is the metaphorical framework which underlies Kant’s articulation of 
various concepts, including the concepts of self, reason, as well as autonomy. Moreover, 
as Lakoff and Johnson argue, it is a metaphorical framework of which Kant was largely 
unaware. Kant states that his aim in writing The Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals is “nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of 
" Dennis McPherson and J. Douglas Rabb. “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy” 
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morality.”'’ Kant’s arguments are, indeed, forceful, but that is not to say that they are 
without problematic aspects. Like so many other great thinkers Kant was a man (and a 
product) of his time. Although Kant sought to provide a universal ethic, his arguments 
have been shaped (or conditioned), in part, by both the language in which he wrote and 
the cultural situation of his time. 
The idea of self-government, or self-legislation, is one which plays a key role in 
Kant’s ethical theory, and can clearly be seen in his “third formulation of the principle 
[of morality], viz., in the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal 
law.”"^ Kant writes that the “will is not only subject to the law, but subject in such a way 
that it must be conceived also as itself prescribing universal law.”^ This focus on the will 
as adhering to a law which the will itself prescribes is notable in that it stands in stark 
contrast to competing ethical theories which rely on either consequentialist principles 
such as happiness or external laws such as ethical theories grounded in theological 
arguments. As a result of this focus on the will, Kant argues that 
Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even beyond the world - can 
possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification 
except a GOOD WILL.... Thus the good will seems to constitute the 
indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy. 
For Kant, moral principles are dictated by reason itself, and more specifically, by 
what he describes as practical reason. The possibility of being able to choose to follow 
^ Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Trans., Lewis White Beck, (Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall, 1995), 8. 
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the principles which reason sets out requires freedom. Our evidence, Kant argues, comes 
to us from our experience of being able to choose, or to will a certain thought or action. 
Although we might not, as Kant states, be able to prove the reality of freedom in itself we 
can, nonetheless, “say that every being which cannot act otherwise than under the Idea of 
freedom is thereby really free in a practical sense.”^ This freedom which is required for 
our ability to choose, or make decisions (moral or otherwise), is closely related to Kant’s 
division of reality into the noumenal and phenomenal realms, the world as it is in itself 
and the world of appearances, as it is for us. According to Kant, it is homo-noumenon 
who is free, as opposed to homo-phenomenon (who, as a physical being, is limited by 
natural laws, such as gravity, etc.). Kant writes: “The rational being counts himself, qua 
intelligence, as belonging to the intelligible world [as homo-noumenon], and only as an 
efficient cause belonging to it does he call his causality will.”^ Each of us is not only an 
appearance for others but also an end-in-itself: a being with the freedom to chose how to 
act. It is along these lines that Kant writes: 
Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has 
the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws (i.e., according 
to principles). This capacity is the will. Since reason is required for the 
derivation of actions from laws, will is nothing less than practical reason.^ 
It is because of this capacity to self-legislate according to rational principles that 
all rational beings must be viewed as ends-in-themselves. All persons must be viewed not 
only as beings in our field of appearances, but also as ends-in-themselves. In other words, 
a person is a being who should not be used simply to further one’s own purposes, a being 
^ Ibid., 65. 
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who can propose an end, and who is therefore deserving of our respect. It is on these 
grounds, then, that Kant argues that “an end in itself does not have mere relative worth 
(price) but an intrinsic worth (dignity).”*® Rational beings, in being able to freely adhere 
to rational principles, are worthy of respect and are granted moral standing. This moral 
standing can be clearly seen in the following formulation of the categorical imperative; 
“Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always 
as an end and never as a means only.”** In other words, one ought to respect the 
autonomy of other persons (as well as one’s own). Kant writes: “Autonomy is thus the 
basis of the dignity of both human nature and every rational nature.”*^ Ethically speaking, 
a person is said to be autonomous, then, when acting according to rational principles 
alone, rather than acting, for example, out of fear of punishment or simply from desire or 
self-interest. 
Kant’s focus on reason, or what he refers to as ‘pure practical reason’ (through 
which the individual discovers the necessity of the moral law and secures autonomy), as 
the source of dignity of human beings has been a key point of contention with some 
Indigenous scholars. For Kant, the capacity of practical reason sets humanity apart from 
the rest of the natural world. Because humanity is free to choose to follow the dictates of 
a universally applicable system of reasoning, humanity alone is deserving of the dignity 
which this moral freedom makes possible. Humanity alone has moral standing. However, 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that although Kant may indeed have thought he was grounding 
^Ubid., 52. 
" Ibid., 46. 
Ibid., 53. 
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his ethical theory in a universal system of reason, in actual fact he “was brilliantly 
working out the entailments of a close-knit cluster of conceptual metaphors that he 
inherited from Western philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition.”’^ In other words, 
there is no one universal ‘way of reasoning’ which we (humanity) make use of in moral, 
or practical, matters. Rather, different worldviews make use of different ‘ways of 
reasoning’. Kant was merely making explicit the implications of one particular ‘way of 
reasoning’ which is made use of in Western thought. 
Indigenous Responses to Kant’s Use of the Concept of Autonomy 
Kant’s position has been criticized from an Indigenous perspective. For example, 
it is McPherson and Rabb’s expressed intent in their article “Some Thoughts on 
Articulating a Native Philosophy” to demonstrate “why such an ethic is necessarily 
ethnocentric (and why that is wrong)”Their concern is that Kant grants moral standing 
to only human persons, which, as they argue, “is very different from the Native American 
notion of a deep respect, perhaps even a religious respect, for a nature that consists, for 
the most part, of what have been called other-than-human persons.”^ ^ 
Developing an understanding of this contention between Western and Indigenous 
peoples’ use of the concept of person is crucial for understanding Native and non-Native 
peoples’ various uses of the concept of autonomy. In contrast to Native peoples’ broad 
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 415. 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 13. 
Ibid., 13. 
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use of the concept of person (which includes other-than-human-person), Kant’s use of 
this concept is far more narrow. Kant writes: 
Man in the system of nature {homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a 
being of slight importance and shares with the rest of the animals, as 
offspring of the earth, a common value (pretium vulgare).... But man as 
regarded as person - that is, as the subject of morally practical reason - is 
exalted above any price; for as such {homo noumenon) he is not to be 
valued as a mere means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but 
as an end in himself'^ 
In order to be considered as a person a being must possess a rational nature, or in 
Kant’s words, be the subject of morally practical reason. Here on earth, humans, and 
only humans, are viewed as possessing this inner (moral) worth which elevates them 
above thinghood, or animalhood, to the level of personhood. In responding to this narrow 
use of the concept of person (a use which includes only humem beings, as homo 
noumena), McPherson and Rabb cite the above passage of Kant in arguing that his 
position reflects a characteristic Western attitude of “complete alienation from the earth. 
The offspring of the earth have only a common value {pretium vulgare), whereas man 
alone has dignity, an intrinsic value worthy of respect.”*^ 
This Western tendency to downplay the role of nature can also be seen in Kant’s 
argument that “whatever is above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent, has 
dignity”^He does however admit that “Nature and likewise art contain nothing which 
could make up for their lack.”’^ In other words, although they contain a value which 
Immanuel Kant. The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals, Trans., Mary J. Gregor, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 99. 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 14. 
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 51. 
Ibid., 52. 
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cannot be replaced, the offspring of the earth, as phenomenal beings, have only a 
common value. Nature in itself (the noumenal aspect of reality), however, Kant argues, 
must remain unknown to us. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes: “ We need 
not... deny that, outside all appearances [of natural phenomena], there are purely 
intelligible grounds of the appearances; but as we have no knowledge of these 
whatsoever, we must never attempt to make use of them in our explanation of nature. 
So, although Kant draws the conclusion that “Autonomy is thus the basis of the dignity of 
both human nature and every rational nature'" he proceeds to discuss the concept of 
autonomy in relation to only human beings, or homo noumena. He does not, because he 
can not, say if Nature has its own rational nature. In other words, we can talk about 
human beings in terms of both a noumenal and a phenomenal self; but as for what lies 
behind the appearance of nature, or natural phenomena (such as rocks, trees, and 
animals), we cannot say. We cannot, on the one hand, deny the possibility that Nature 
might indeed possess a rational nature, nor can we, on the other hand, affirm the 
possibility of a purely intelligible Nature which might underlie nature. The sentiment 
which underlies Kant’s argument here can be understood in terms of the early 
Wittgenstein’s dictum that “[w]hat we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence.” In 
other words, since we cannot know Nature beyond its appearance, we must talk about 
Nature only in terms of its appearance. 
Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (Houndmills; MacMillan Press, 
1993), 551. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 53. The italics are my own. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, 
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An interesting parallel to Kant’s division of reality into the noumenal and 
phenomenal realms can be seen in Indigenous thought. Ojibwa scholar James Dumont 
writes: “Ojibwa man is always religious man because he knows that as a ‘soul/body’ he 
moves about in both ordinary and non-ordinary reality... and realizes, further, that... he 
must establish, once and for all, absolute contact with the spirit world.”^^ Although Kant 
does recognize that humans belong to both noumenal and phenomenal realms, man as a 
noumenal being is separate from Nature, representing a fundamental separation between 
man and nature, a separation between self (as a moral self) and other. However, we see in 
Dumont’s words that for Indigenous peoples there is not this stark separation between self 
and other. Through the vision quest, one discovers, as McPherson and Rabb write, that 
“we are not really apart from the earth and other people. We are a part of the earth and 
other people.”^"^ For Indigenous peoples it is non-ordinary reality (or the noumenal) which 
unites man and nature, whereas for Kant it seems the noumenal separates man from 
nature. 
Orality, Literacy, the Use of Metaphor, and Ways of Reasoning 
Indigenous criticisms of Kant’s use of the concepts of reason and person (or self), 
such as those put forward by McPherson and Rabb, very closely parallel, in their 
substance, Walter Ong’s arguments in Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the 
Word. Central to Ong’s work is the argument that the shift in consciousness which 
James Dumont. “Journey to Daylight-Land: Through Ojibwa Eyes” Laurentian University Review 8:2 
1976: 39. 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 17. 
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accompanied the adoption of writing in Europe is one of the notable factors which is 
responsible for European culture’s characteristic alienation from the natural world. 
Stated in terms of Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments, the written word has opened 
up new metaphorical possibilities to the members of literate cultures. For example, in 
Western culture, people have access to metaphors such as ‘the letter of the law’ for 
expressing the concept of strictness, or stringency, a metaphor which relies heavily on the 
use of the written, phonetic alphabet. In oral cultures, such a metaphor does not seem to 
be possible. We see here, then, what Lakoff and Johnson mean when they say “that a 
significant part of the lexical differences across languages may have to do with 
differences in conventional imagery.”^^ The visual images of letters and written words 
are not a part of the conventional imagery which the members of oral cultures have at 
their disposal. 
Similarly, David Abram, in The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language 
in a More-Than-Human World, argues that it was the development of the written alphabet 
which allowed Western thinkers to “stand at a new distance from the natural order, their 
thoughts inhabiting a different mode of temporality from the flux of nature, which they 
now question and strive to understand.”^^ Whereas Western thinkers tend to use the 
concept of person in a more abstract sense (a self which somehow transcends the natural 
world). Indigenous peoples tend, as Ong argues, “to use concepts in situational. 
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 69. 
David Abram. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World 
(New York; Vintage Books, 1996), 108. 
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operational frames of reference that are minimally abstract in the sense that they remain 
close to the living human lifeworld.”^^ 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest that the written word opened up new metaphorical 
possibilities, metaphorical possibilities which have eventually led to, or allowed for, the 
development of a variety of different schools of philosophical thought. They argue that 
the ‘Thought as Language’ metaphor: 
is central to the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. Its effect is to 
view the concepts expressed by language as linguistic symbols 
meaningless in themselves and requiring interpretation. What follows from 
that metaphor is that analysis of language is analysis of thought.^^ 
In other words, metaphorical frameworks such as the ‘Thought as Language’ 
metaphor have led to the analytic tradition’s view of language where words (and their 
meanings) are understood as being products of the human mind, separate from the inert, 
discrete entities which they name. Language, in this view, is a strictly human affair. 
Whereas, in Indigenous thought, the kinds of metaphor which arise are, as Ong argues, 
much less abstract (than the Western notion of ‘linguistic symbols’), which has, in turn, 
led to, as he says, the use of concepts in a “situational, operational frame of reference.” 
Moreover, Indigenous peoples’ understanding of language itself, generally speaking, is 
shaped by their particular use of metaphor. As Abram writes: “Indeed, for many oral, 
indigenous peoples, the boundaries enacted by their languages are more like permeable 
membranes binding the peoples to their particular terrains, rather than barriers walling 
Walter Ong. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1984), 49. 
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 442. 
Ong, Orality and Literacy, 49. 
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them off from the land.”^^ So, rather than holding a view of language as being merely a 
human construct, as is in the case of the Western analytic tradition. Indigenous peoples 
hold a very different overall view of language. Abram argues: 
By affirming that the other animals have their own languages, and that 
even the rustling of the leaves in an oak tree or an aspen grove is itself a 
kind of voice, oral peoples bind their senses to the shifting sounds and 
gestures of the local earth, and thus ensure that their own ways of speaking 
remain informed by the life of the land.^' 
In order to better understand Native and non-Native peoples’ unique uses of 
concepts we must make allowances for not only factors such as the oral or written nature 
of their traditions, but also the unique influences of the specific conceptual frameworks 
(and the metaphors used within these frameworks) in which their respective worldviews 
developed. The meaning of a concept must be viewed in the context of the conceptual 
framework in which it is being used. In examining how concepts are being used in a 
particular cultural context, we must be sure not to view concepts as having discrete 
meanings which can be determined in isolation from the use of other concepts in that 
particular cultural perspective. 
Although it is no longer acceptable to say that the various concepts we use 
correspond to the world as it really is, how we use concepts, and language in general, 
depends upon our connection to the world, our participation, as Abram says, in “this 
dynamic, interconnected reality that provokes and sustains ail our speaking” In light of 
the depth of our connection to the animate, physical landscape, Abram argues: 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 256. 
Ibid., 256. The italics are my own. 
Ibid., 85. 
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"Ultimately, then, it is not the human body alone but rather the whole of the sensuous 
world that provides the deep structures of language.Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments 
also provide an innovative exploration of the links between 1) our physical bodies and 
our ways of reasoning and communicating, and 2) the role of metaphors in understanding 
and articulating concepts. In viewing language and the world as comprising one 
systematic whole, Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments parallel, in an important way, the 
arguments of David Abram, as well as those of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Donald 
Davidson. Lakoff and Johnson write: “The mind is not merely embodied, but embodied 
in such as way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the commonalities of our 
bodies and of the environments we live in.”^"^ The imagery, patterns, sounds, and other 
aspects of the landscape upon which we are situated are woven into, and support, our 
conceptual frameworks, and our ways of communicating about the world. It is this 
grounding in the physical landscape which also serves as ground for our sense of self. 
But, as Lakoff and Johnson argue: 
There is no Fregean person - as posed by analytic philosophy - for whom 
thought has been extruded from the body.... Because our conceptual 
systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our 
bodies. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is 
not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is 
false.^^ 
It was the goal of Frege and philosophers with similar views to rid language of the 
vagueness of metaphorical meaning, and replace it with precise logical meaning. But, as 
Ong and Abram have argued, the static appearance of written text - the written, phonetic 
Ibid., 85. 
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 6. 
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alphabet - gave the illusion that words had static and precise meanings. For philosophers 
such as Frege, language was understood as being about the world, but not dependent on 
the world. Words and concepts were understood as having meaning in a very literal 
sense. The problem which arises in the correspondence view of language and meaning, as 
Lakoff and Johnson note, is that “because ideas have to be literal if they are to fit the 
world, they cannot be metaphorical. That is why the very idea of a conceptual metaphor is 
at odds with this interpretation of the [correspondence] theory.” However, given the 
view that meaning is largely a matter of coherence with a particular context, it follows 
that, as Lakoff and Johnson argue: “Metaphor is centrally a matter of thought, not just 
words.”^^ Metaphors arise when concepts are used in novel situations, for example, in the 
attempt to articulate our ideas about things which we cannot easily point at, such as love, 
our idea of self, and the idea of autonomy. Although metaphor is largely a matter of 
thought, it must be remembered that language itself is not completely a matter of human 
thought. Language finds its roots in our connection to the physical landscape. Lakoff and 
Johnson write: “Since reason is shaped by the body, it is not radically free, because the 
possible human conceptual systems and the possible forms of reason are limited. In 
addition, once we have learned a conceptual system... we are not free to think just 
anyway.” Which kinds of metaphors are used within a particular conceptual framework 
are not, then, completely random, nor up to us. 
Ibid., 120. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
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Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson indicate: “The fact that abstract thought is mostly 
metaphorical means that answers to philosophical questions have always been, and 
always will be, mostly metaphorical.”^^ In contrast to the efforts of Western analytic 
philosophers, such as Frege, to resolve philosophical problems through purely linguistic 
analysis, Lakoff and Johnson argue: “Metaphorical thought is the principle tool that 
makes philosophical insight possible and that constrains the forms that philosophy can 
take.”"^^ In terms of this study, understanding the metaphorical use of particular concepts, 
such as the concept of autonomy, can be viewed as a gateway to, or a tool for, 
understanding how to reason according to a particular conceptual framework. An 
understanding of the use of metaphor as tool for articulating meaning and our beliefs 
about the world provides a useful way of gaining access to the world views of North 
American Indigenous peoples. Lakoff and Johnson’s approach is indispensable in 
establishing meaningful philosophical dialogue between individuals grounded in different 
worldviews. 
Autonomy and Other-Than-Human Persons 
Whereas Kant grounds his notion of person (beings deserving of respect) in the 
capacity a being has for rationality. Indigenous peoples’ use of the concept of person 
seems grounded, rather, in the simple fact that they are beings, that they exist. In Freedom 
and Culture, Dorothy Lee writes that in Navaho society: “Adults and children are valued 
Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid., 1. 
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for their sheer being, just because they are.""^^ It is not, as it is with Kant, that beings are 
valued because they have some special capacity, and hence, it is understandable that to 
Indigenous peoples, Kant's focus on the human capacity for rational thought seems like 
quite the dubious assumption. 
Cree philosopher Lorraine Brundige criticizes Kant’s ethical theory, arguing that 
this is “one significant instance, where the aboriginal view is diametrically opposed to 
that found in one particular non-Native world view.”"^^ Her criticism is that Kant does not 
think that we have any direct duty to animals, that they are not worthy of our respect. She 
notes that, in Kant’s philosophy, the status of animals arises not in connection with any 
direct or indirect duty we might have to them as other beings, but only insofar as Kant 
thinks that “he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men.”"^^ The 
status of animals, here, seems to Kant an afterthought, a secondary, and relatively 
unimportant consideration; or it is, at least, a consideration unworthy of much 
philosophical consideration. 
McPherson and Rabb criticize Kant on similar grounds in their article “Some 
Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”. Their concern lies with Kant’s 
anthropocentric (human-centered) attitude. Kant has not simply failed to consider other- 
than-human beings, he views them as belonging solely to the phenomenal realm. In other 
words, he views their behaviour as causally determined, as opposed to being governed by 
a (rational) will. Other-than-human beings are not free in the same sense that we humans 
Dorothy Lee. Freedom and Culture (Prentice-Hall, 1959), 10. 
Lorraine Brundige. “Continuity ofNative Values: Cree and OJibwa” (Master’s Thesis, Lakehead 
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84 
are. McPherson and Rabb argue that “Kant himself thought he had justified the 
application of causal explanation to everything in what he called the phenomenal world, 
the world we discover through sense perception.Indigenous peoples, they argue, hold a 
\ ery different view on the status of other-than-human persons. These other-than-human 
persons are afforded dignity and respect; they are regarded as relatives and are treated 
accordingly. This view of other-than-human persons (or, use of the concept of person) is 
one which has developed within the larger context of various Indigenous worldviews. 
McPherson and Rabb note that “the entire narrative tradition plays an important role in 
helping the individual formulate a view of the world and thus decide what sorts of things 
deserve the respect accorded to ‘persons 
Just as Pomedli gives consideration to the religious and philosophical training of 
Jesuit missionaries in order to understand their reasons for translating Christian concepts 
(into the Huron language) in a particular way, consideration must also be given to reasons 
for Indigenous peoples’ particular use of concepts. In terms of this study, consideration 
must be given to the factors that shape how Indigenous peoples use concepts which have 
been adopted from Western philosophical traditions. In carrying out this conceptual 
archaeology it is important to look at not only the ‘network of inferential associations’ 
between various concepts, but also the metaphors which are used to articulate those 
concepts. It is important to remember that these uses are not random, but, rather, that 
Indigenous peoples’ use of the concept of person has been shaped through the ways in 
which they explore their relationship with the lifeworld. One such formative influence 
^ McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 13. 
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which McPherson and Rabb mention is the vision quest. Used in conjunction with (or, in 
the context of) the whole narrative tradition, the vision quest is intended to facilitate the 
individual’s exploration of his/her relationship with the lifeworld, the tapestry of life into 
which we are all woven. McPherson and Rabb write: 
One of the things discovered during the vision quest is that we are not 
really apart from the earth and other people. We are rather a part of the 
earth and other people. The experience seems to bring about the realization 
that willing the good of others is not in any sense a form of self-sacrifice, 
given the enlarged sense of self acquired in the journey into non-ordinary 
reality."^^ 
Care should be taken here to avoid misunderstanding, for, McPherson and Rabb 
warn that this notion of an enlarged sense of self “may convey a sense of arrogant 
individualism, which is not intended and is certainly not present.For my purpose here, 
it will suffice to say that, generally speaking, Indigenous peoples have a sense of self 
which is substantially different from the Western notions of a self as either an objective 
observer of physical phenomena or as a distinct moral self (which Kant argues for in his 
moral philosophy). Indigenous peoples’ notion of person seems to dissolve the distinction 
between the individual’s ordinary sense of self (as an individual human being) and the 
other beings we are in contact with, whereas Western notions of self such as Kant’s, 
seem to reinforce this distinction. 
In terms of Kant’s moral theory, this distinction is very clear. Here on earth, the 
only moral agents are humans. Just as Indigenous peoples’ use of concepts have been 
Ibid., 17. 
Ibid., 17. 
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shaped by a backdrop of largely unthought formative influences, or pre-suppositions, so 
have Kant’s. A conceptual archaeology of Kantian thought must then begin with an 
understanding of some of the social, philosophical, metaphorical factors which have 
played a role in shaping Kant’s thought. Kant’s proclivity for focusing on human beings 
(and our rational capacity) is not all that mysterious. Living in cities, buying food at the 
market, and other such things, do not lend themselves well to developing and maintaining 
a relationship with the physical landscape. With increasing numbers of people living in 
cities, adults and children alike began to orient their sense of self to reflect the human 
relationships with which they almost exclusively concerned themselves. The technology 
of writing has also acted as a catalyst for this propensity to focus on only human beings. 
Ong states: “Writing introduces division and alienation, but a higher unity as well. It 
intensifies the sense of self and fosters more conscious interaction between persons.By 
Kant’s day, the individual’s personal relationship with lifeworld, had become, in a sense, 
irrelevant. It was human affairs with which individuals, and especially philosophers, were 
concerned. 
Another central factor, as we have seen, which served in shaping Kant’s thought 
(or his articulation of concepts such as autonomy) is the unthought use of metaphor. Two 
such metaphors which underlie Kant’s use of the concept of person are, as Lakoff and 
Johnson argue, the Society of Mind and Family of Man metaphors. The Society of Mind 
metaphor (which, as Lakoff and Johnson note, is also central to the modem science of 
psychology) provides a way of understanding or defining mind. The mind in this context 
is understood as an intangible, mental substance, or a Cartesian self which is distinct and 
49 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 179. 
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separate from material substance. Moreover, as Lakoff and Johnson argue, this metaphor 
“imposes a structure on the mind, producing a metaphorical conception of what the mind 
is and how it operates.Lakoff and Johnson wTite: 
In the [Society of Mind] metaphor, the mind is conceptualized as a society 
whose members perform distinct, nonoverlapping tasks necessary for the 
successful functioning of that society.... For example, since each person in 
the Society of Mind is a separate autonomous agent, each faculty of mind 
is separate and autonomous.... Since society is structured hierarchically 
with an executive giving orders, so too the mind has a hierarchical 
structure and an executive in control.^* 
In our daily affairs, according to Kant, it is the faculty of reason (or practical 
reason) which ought to have ‘executive control’ over our decision making. In the 
metaphorical terminology of Lakoff and Johnson, reason can be understood as a Father in 
the Society of Mind, a Father whose role it is to govern over the other persons (or 
faculties of mind) in the Society of Mind metaphor. In the above quote we also see that 
the Society of Mind metaphor relies on a very specific notion of society as being 
hierarchically structured (with only one person exercising control over all other persons 
who comprise this society). Kant’s use of the concept of person relies not only on this 
metaphorical conception of mind, but it also reflects what Lakoff and Johnson refer to as 
the Family of Man metaphor. They write: 
This metaphor entails that we all have a moral obligation to treat each 
other as we would family members, according to an ideal model of what a 
family is.... In other words, this metaphor projects family moral structure 
onto a universal moral structure. For example, it is a consequence of this 
metaphor that just as each child in the family is subject to the same moral 
authority and moral laws, so each person in the world is subject to the 
same moral authority and moral laws... 
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 413. 
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This metaphor, however, is very general. It does not say anything 
about what type of family humankind is to be.^^ 
Just as the Society of Mind metaphor relies on a specific social structure, the 
Family of Man metaphor relies on a specific type of family structure. According to Lakoff 
and Johnson, Kant’s work reflects a Strict Father version of the Family of Man metaphor, 
wherein, metaphorically speaking. Reason holds (or ought to hold) executive or absolute 
power in making decisions regarding moral matters. Lakoff and Johnson outline the 
overall arrangement of the metaphorical framework which underlies Kant’s moral theory 
with the following diagram: 
THE UNIVERSAL MORALITY AS STRICT 
FATHER MORALITY METAPHOR 
Strict Father Morality 
Family 
Each Child -> 
Other Children 
Father -> 
Father’s Moral Authority 
Father’s Commands -> 
Obedience To Father 
Family Moral Relations 
Family Nurturance To ^ 
Be Morally Strong 
Universal Rational Morality 
Humankind 
Each Human Being 
Every Other Human Being 
Universal Reason 
Universal Moral Authority 
Universal Moral Laws 
Obedience To Universal Moral Laws 
Universal Moral Relations 
Universal Nurturance To Be Morally 
Strong^^ 
The cumulative effect of these various metaphors, including the Society of Mind 
and Family of Man metaphors, serves, as Lakoff and Johnson argue, as the “basis for 
Kant’s claim that morality is founded on universal human reason issuing from absolute 
and universally valid moral commands.Persons, or members of the moral community, 
Ibid., 420. 
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are, therefore, those beings which hold membership in the Society of Mind and the 
Family of Man: human beings. 
Although it might be argued that in some instances Indigenous peoples hold a 
somewhat dualistic view of reality as we saw in James Dumont’s comments regarding the 
Ojibwa peoples’ recognition ordinary and non-ordinary realities, such a dualistic view 
finds its place within the larger context of spiritual holism. The Ojibwa, like most 
Indigenous peoples, do not view themselves as holding membership in one or the other of 
these realities but both. According to this view there is only one community, or Family, 
and all beings hold equal membership in that community. It is not a hierarchical 
community. What follows is a very different use of the concept of person. Holding a view 
such as the spiritual holism of Lakota/Dakota peoples, as Meyer and Ramirez argue, 
“would entail responding to the world according to the exhortation: Mitakuye oyasin! - 
‘We are all related!This use of the concept of person can also be seen in Indigenous 
peoples’ use of such similar phrases as ‘All my relations’. Thomas King (Cherokee), in 
the ‘Introduction’ to All My Relations: An Anthology of Contemporary Canadian Native 
Fiction, writes: 
‘All my relations’ is at first a reminder of who we are and of our 
relationship with both our family and our relatives.... But the relationships 
that Native people see go further, the web of kinship extending to the 
animals, to the birds, to the fish, to the plants, to all the animate and 
inanimate forms that can be seen or imagined. More than that, ‘All my 
relations’ is an encouragement for us to accept the responsibility we have 
within this universal family by living our lives in a harmonious and moral 
Leroy Meyer and Tony Ramirez. “Wakinyan Hotan: The Thunder Beings Call Out; The Inscrutability of 
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matter (a common admonishment is to say of someone that they act as if 
they have no relations.'^ 
Autonomy and Children 
McPherson and Brundige have each put forward criticisms concerning the status 
of children in Kant’s ethical theory. These criticisms involve not only differences 
regarding the concept of person, but also Indigenous scholars’ response to the Kantian 
notion of heteronomy. An autonomous being, according to Kant, is a being who is free to 
impose on himself or herself laws (as discovered though a universally applicable system 
of reasoning). Kant argues that we can lose our autonomy (and fall into a state of 
heteronomy) in two different ways. McPherson and Rabb provide an excellent summary 
of these two ways: 
We are... always in danger of losing our autonomy in one of two ways: (1) 
by giving in to a desire instead of exercising our own will power and 
acting on principle, on the moral law, in which case we become merely 
part of the causal order (homo phenomenon); or (2) by submitting to a law 
imposed by another, in which case though our behaviour is law-governed, 
it is not autonomous since the law is not self imposed. 
Since it is unlikely that Kant viewed children as being able to recognize and 
impose upon themselves rational moral principles, children are, therefore, not viewed as 
autonomous beings. Brundige, and McPherson and Rabb put forward nearly identical 
interpretations of Kant’s views on children and heteronomy. Brundige writes: 
An autonomous person is one who is free to impose laws on him/herself, 
therefore being a self-governing agent. We achieve this state, according to 
Kant, by acting out of moral principle rather than from desire. Thus only 
Thomas King. All My Relations: An Anthology of Contemporary Canadian Native Fiction, Thomas 
King, Ed., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), ix. 
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rational beings are capable of this ability to self-govem. As children we 
must first be governed by others. Kant calls this type of governing 
c o 
heteronomous. Autonomy then results from heteronomy. 
Similarly, McPherson and Rabb write: 
Still, it is important to learn to govern our behaviour according to laws or 
moral principles. As children we are governed by rules imposed by 
parents, teachers, etc. - by adults. As we achieve adulthood, having 
already learned law-like behaviour, we continue to impose on ourselves 
such laws as we still accept. In short, heteronomy is the first step toward 
autonomy.^^ 
In these two interpretations of Kant’s arguments, children learn law-like 
behaviour from parents (or generally, from adults). In a sense, children learn to mimic the 
behaviour of adults, and then, once adulthood is reached, we simply “impose on ourselves 
such laws as we still acceptIn each of the two characterizations of Kant’s position on 
children, by Indigenous scholars, mentioned above, children are seen as being incapable 
of freely imposing upon themselves law-like behaviour. Children must submit to the law 
of their parents and teachers; children are, therefore, in a state of heteronomy, not 
autonomy. Since children are not fully capable of acting autonomously, they have only 
limited moral standing. 
Such a view of children (as heteronomous), however, does not arise in Native 
societies. Brundige argues that the “European or Euro-Canadian world view toward 
children has always been in direct opposition to that of the North American aboriginal 
people”^*, and that Indigenous peoples “do not believe as Kant, or other Europeans, that 
Brundige, “Continuity of Native Values; Cree and Ojibwa”, 48. 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 14-15. 
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children should be governed from without.” Likewise, McPherson and Rabb argue: 
"Heteronomy may well be an implicit part of the Western philosophical tradition 
stemming from ancient Greece. However, it most certainly is not a concept native to 
North America.” Indigenous people do not see themselves as having a right to govern 
over their children, as is the case in Western traditions. In regard to these differences 
between Native and non-Native views on children, McPherson and Rabb argue that 
”[o]ne point on which all researchers seem to agree is that Native children are given much 
more freedom than their non-Native counterparts.”^"^ 
One publication to which McPherson and Rabb make several references in their 
own work is the British Columbia Ministry of Education’s Native Literacy and Life Skills 
Curriculum Guidelines!'^ Written by a committee made up primarily of Native people, it 
serves as an excellent example of Indigenous peoples’ use of the concept of autonomy. 
Although the committee reminds us that any “discussion of cultural learning styles is 
fraught with danger because of the tendency toward stereotyping,”^^ the distinction they 
draw between Native and non-Native learning styles is clear. The Native child is 
described as “independent and autonomous.” Non-Native children, on the other hand. 
Ibid., 5\. 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 15. 
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are said to be “dependent and controlled.Moreover, the committee suggests that the 
Native child is “considered a person... [and is]... free to explore his own environment,”^^ 
whereas non-Native children are “watched and controlled by parents throughout 
childhood.”^^ In other words, the Native child’s “autonomy allows him his own 
decisions. 
A significant problem arises if we are to understand this use of the concept of 
autonomy in a strictly Kantian sense. The problem here is that Native people might be 
viewed as making the claim that Native children are, in a Kantian sense, fully rational 
beings. It seems, rather, that Native children are simply granted the freedom to develop 
their reasoning processes without excessive external direction (from parents and other 
community members). A key notion, then, connected with the concept of autonomy is 
that of non-interference. Brundige, in her study documenting the principle of non- 
interference, relates the following example concerning parenting methods which are 
commonly found in Native communities: 
I asked her [an Ojibwa Elder] whether children learned through 
watching others. She answered that she had been asked that question many 
times. As she thought about the answer she began to realize that learning 
was done by watching parents as they were the role models. She said, 
“You watch them; whatever they do, you will do.” It was obvious that she, 
like the Cree Elder mentioned... [earlier in her study], had to think about 
how it was they came to learn. Neither Elder was aware of being taught, at 
least not in the Western sense of teaching, that is by shaping. 
In the chapter on non-interference I talked about a mother who provides 
options for her child to help him make decisions. Both the method used by 
this mother and the method discussed by the Elder are means for teaching 
Ibid., 13. 
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responsibility or abilities such as hunting, trapping and cooking that are 
accomplished through a way of life called “respect.” Children watch then, 
they [model] engage in the activity. “ 
Just as Native peoples’ uses of the concept of autonomy have been shaped by their 
particular cultural traditions and perspectives, these traditions have also served in shaping 
their particular interpretations of the arguments of Western philosophers. My suggestion 
is that Indigenous scholars’ recognition of the differences between Native and non-Native 
perspectives has had an influence on their characterization of Kant’s ethical theory, and 
specifically, their view that autonomy requires a stage, or phase, of heteronomy. 
Brundige, and McPherson and Rabb’s interpretations both rely on the recognition that 
there is, in the Western philosophical tradition, a tendency to view the world and time 
itself, in a linear fashion. We can see this influence in that they see Kant as arguing that 
autonomy and heteronomy are sequentially connected. In other words, these Native 
interpretations of Kant seem to indicate that heteronomy must necessarily precede 
autonomy in a person’s natural development from childhood into adulthood; a view 
which is radically different from the Native view. 
Indigenous Interpretations of Kant: Critical and Problematic 
In arguing for such drastic differences in worldviews. Indigenous peoples are 
better able to set their own views apart from both the Western worldview and the 
arguments put forward by Kant. McPherson and Rabb write: 
In this critique of the Eurocentricity of Kant’s moral philosophy, we hope 
to have illustrated one possible way of articulating a Native perspective 
that would be of interest to the Western philosopher and yet not force this 
Brundige, “Continuity of Native Values: Cree and Ojibwa”, 132-133. The first two additions in square 
brackets are my own. 
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truly Indigenous North American philosophy into the mold of Western 
thought. 
In carrying out their critique, however, McPherson and Rabb may have, though 
inadvertently, actually forced Kant’s moral philosophy into a mold which it does not quite 
fit: the mold of traditional Western thought. They have argued, as has Brundige, that the 
subjugation of children to the will, or laws, of their parents is compatible with Kant’s 
moral philosophy. Admittedly, it is a position which may very well be compatible with 
Kant’s arguments, but it is not the only position that can be inferred from Kant’s 
arguments. Given their particular interpretation of Kant’s arguments, that heteronomy is 
required for autonomy, 1 suggest that Indigenous scholars have missed aspects and 
interpretations of Kant’s moral philosophy which might be of use to Indigenous peoples 
in their criticisms of the Western worldview in general (for example, traditional Western 
parenting methods such as the disciplining of children both verbally and physically). 
Kant’s focus on fully developed rational beings is indeed a problematic aspect of 
his ethical theory. In being charitable we must assume that Kant did not see people as 
suddenly one moment becoming rational, but rather that reason is something which 
develops from childhood on through the rest of our lives. Moreover, it should be noted 
that Kant, himself, believed that most people (adults) remain in a state of heteronomy. 
Kant writes: “Laziness and cowardice are the reasons so great a portion of mankind, after 
nature has long since discharged them from external direction..., nevertheless remain 
under lifelong tutelage”^"^ 
McPherson and Rabb, “Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy”, 20. 
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With a deep sense of concern, Kant argues that individuals should strive to 
achieve an increasing degree of autonomy. That an individual, i.e., a child, should 
necessarily undergo a stage of heteronomy is a position which does not necessarily follow 
from Kant’s arguments. Rather, the Indigenous position that children be granted the 
freedom to make their own decisions (though not in an absolute way), is a position with 
which Kant would likely concur. In “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant argues: 
Enlightenment is man’s release from self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is 
man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from 
another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of 
reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction 
from another 
Imposing heteronomy on children seems counterproductive to their becoming 
autonomous. Forcing a stage of heteronomy on children is likely to hinder their ability, in 
later years, to act on their own accord as autonomous adults. To illustrate my point I look 
to a similar argument Brundige puts forward. Citing her discussion with a Native Elder, 
she writes: 
The way I understood... [his] statement is: if you raise a wolf in a cage he 
will not learn the skills necessary for his survival as a wolf. So when you 
release him and he is free to go, he will not be prepared for survival. Now 
if you raise a child within a restricted environment, when it is time to let 
go, he/she will not be properly prepared for the environment the child will 
be entering. 
For Kant, enlightenment is a release from self-incurred tutelage. Imposing 
heteronomy on children would seem to make this release from self-incurred tutelage 
much more difficult. So, it seems that we need not tell our children how to act and 
Ibid., 83. The italics are my own. 
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reason, but rather, tutor, or show, our children how to act, and provide them with the tools 
required for them to develop their reason. Setting an example for our children is very 
different from telling our children how to act. 
It is precisely this sort of lack of direction (or, non-interference) which Native 
parents afford their children. As Brundige writes: “They believe their children have the 
right to make their own decisions unhampered by parental coercion.” In contrast, the 
right of parents to disciple their children, in Western mainstream society, is a right which 
has been embedded into Western cultural traditions long before Kant’s day. It is not a 
right which is necessarily derived from, or justified by, Kant’s ethical theory. This 
authoritative parental role, in Western culture, Brundige argues, maintains its integrity 
through being viewed as a God-given right, and is thus absolute and inviolate. In Native 
society, however, the non-interference which children are afforded is not absolute. 
Brundige states: 
There are times when interference is necessary; for example, it would be 
ridiculous to image a Native mother deliberately letting her child crawl 
into a burning fire-pit because that is where the child wanted to go. She 
would of course remove her child from the danger. It is important to stress 
that non-interference means not interfering in a manner that is likely to 
cause emotional harm. Dignity must not be harmed. All persons are 
78 deserving of respect and dignity, even children. 
The inability of Western people to comprehend this non-interference which 
Native parents afford to their children stems, in part, from a failure to interpret this non- 
interference in terms of the full context of Native peoples’ cultural traditions and Native 
ways of thinking. A Western misconception seems to be that Native peoples are arguing 
Ibid., 48. 
78 Ibid., 46. 
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that their children are somehow fully rational human beings and are therefore left to their 
own devices, except in dire circumstances. Brundige argues: “Non-interference is 
misunderstood by many non-natives and led to the forced removal of many Native 
children from their homes.Native peoples' granting of autonomy to their children and 
the freedom which they afford them must, instead, be viewed in the context of Native 
society as a whole. Social practices, or cultural tools, such as the narrative traditions and 
the vision quest are important features of this larger context. These aspects of Native 
culture are crucial for: 1) shaping how individuals reason about the world, and 2) 
assisting the individual in learning how and where to exercise his/her reason (without 
compromising his/her own, or another’s, autonomy and dignity). McPherson and Rabb 
argue: 
the [narrative] tradition feeds into, and to some extent governs, the vision 
quest, just as the vision quest in its turn feed into and reinforces the 
narrative and other traditions. This mutual interaction leads to the 
development of individual persons who actively will the good of other 
persons, both human and other-than-human, in their mutually shared 
community. 
It is through these traditions that children learn to both give consideration and 
afford respect to other-than-human persons. In other words, these traditions provide the 
means for children (and adults as well) to formulate a sense of identification with beings 
from both human and other-than-human communities. Deeply embedded in this process 
is the notion, or activity, of empathetic projection. Lakoff and Johnson argue: 
Ibid., 54. 
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Empathetic projection is, within Nuturant Parent morality [as opposed 
to Kant’s Strict Father morality], also the major capacity to be developed 
in the child. Empathy - the focused, imaginative experience of the other - 
is the precondition for nurturant morality. Empathy links moral values to 
spiritual experience. 
Empathetic projection is possible not only with other people, but with 
animals.^* 
Empathetic projection involves more than just a simple, ‘imaginative experience 
of the other’. The experience provides a framework for establishing relations with the 
other. As Lakoff and Johnson argue: “Embodied spirituality is more than just spiritual 
on 
experience. It is an ethical relationship to the world.” One example which Lakoff and 
Johnson offer is the spiritual experience of shamans in Indigenous cultures. They write: 
“Shamans in aboriginal cultures around the world observe animals closely by 
empathetically ‘becoming’ the animals,... an experience of being in the body of a very 
different kind of being.”^^ Abram also provides a characterization of this spiritual 
experience of shamans: 
It is this, we might say, that defines the shaman: the ability to readily slip 
out of the perceptual boundaries that demarcate his or her particular 
culture - boundaries reinforced by social customs, taboos, and most 
importantly, the common speech or language - in order to make contact 
with, and learn from, the other powers in the land. 
It is this communication the shaman relies on for orienting “the content of the 
prayers..., the countless ritual gestures..., [and] the daily propitiations and praise that 
oc 
flow from her toward the land and its many voices.” This sort of communication is also 
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central to the vision quest. Douglas Cardinal relates his own experience of the vision 
quest: 
After 24 hours you get bored of listening to yourself complain. So you 
start looking outside yourself and you start seeing a whole myriad of life 
around you.... On the second day, like the elders say, you have to ‘come in 
power.’ If you set yourself in power with every living thing, then you can 
see - really see and communicate with every living thing. So then you start 
having these magical experiences.^^ 
These cultural traditions are intended to aid in children’s development. These 
traditions take place in a social context, a community; and it is a community comprised of 
more than just human persons. It is in the context of these traditions that children are 
afforded the freedom to develop their own rational capacities, their own way of thinking 
about things and doing things. A child’s autonomy is grounded in his or her membership 
and participation, as a unique individual, in a mutually shared community. 
Western mainstream society stands in stark contrast to this mutually shared 
community in which Indigenous peoples participate. In Western society, individuality is 
held at a premium. The Western notion of community does not reach as deep as 
Indigenous peoples’ understanding, or use, of this concept. The larger community, in 
Western society, does not seem to provide the same sort of cohesion between individuals 
as the mutually shared community we find in Indigenous societies. Nonetheless, adults 
and children alike learn to use the concept of autonomy in a variety of social contexts, for 
example, in the context of their particular family traditions and also in a larger social 
context (in either a secular or religious context). Kant’s ethical theory has, in its own way. 
Douglas Cardinal. “Dancing with Chaos: An Interview with Douglas Cardinal” in McPherson and Rabb, 
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shaped the public, or social, uses of the concept of autonomy in Western society. 
However, we must be careful not to equate socially prevalent uses of this concept with a 
conclusion which might not necessarily follow from Kant’s moral philosophy: that 
heteronomy is a necessary step in reaching autonomy. 
My suggestion is that the end result which Kant’s work had in view is a society 
not all that different from the Indigenous view of a mutually shared community 
characterized by McPherson and Rabb. In fact, McPherson and Rabb go so far as to write: 
“Are we really suggesting that this Kantian ideal, this kingdom of ends, may actually have 
been achieved on earth by pre-contact North American civilizations? Yes, this is exactly 
what we [McPherson and Rabb] are claiming.” Moreover, we see that Kant had, as an 
ideal, a view of society very different from the one in which he lived. Kant writes: 
Statutes and formulas, those mechanical tools of the rational employment 
or rather mis-employment of his natural gifts, are fetters of an everlasting 
tutelage.... Thus the public can only slowly attain enlightenment. Perhaps 
a fall of personal despotism or of avaricious or tyrannical oppression may 
be accomplished by revolution, but never a true reform in ways of 
thinking. Rather, new prejudices will serve as well as old ones to harness 
88 the great unthinking masses. 
Kant, here, is criticizing the blind acceptance of laws as an absolute guide to 
acceptable behaviour in Western society. Moreover, it is not simply one particular set of 
laws which Kant is criticizing here, but, rather, the blind acceptance of any sets of laws or 
formulas. Kant does not want to see one set of laws simply substituted for another. 
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Rather, he is looking for a much more fundamental kind of change. He is looking, he 
says, for a true reform in ways of thinking. 
The parallel I wish to draw here is that if individuals (adults) in Western society 
reach autonomy through the unfettered or unhampered use of their capacity to reason (in 
some form or another), then individuals might be more likely to have the courage to 
exercise their capacity for reason if they are allowed to do so as children, though not in an 
absolute way. Imposing a stage of heteronomy on children seems to only hinder their 
ability to achieve autonomy as adults. Strict adherence to laws or mles set out by parents 
can not reveal to the child the principles upon which those laws or rules are grounded. 
Each of us must discover those principle for ourselves, and we must afford others the 
freedom to do so on their own terms, or in their own way. So, whereas Indigenous 
scholars argue that Kant saw heteronomy as a necessary prerequisite for autonomy, 
Kant’s own arguments seem to suggest that this need not be the case. It is not a view 
which follows necessarily from Kant’s position. 
Autonomy and Constitutional Issues 
In contrast to T) socially prevalent uses of the concept of autonomy and 2) 
traditional interpretations of Kant’s views on the moral standing of children, Kant has 
also put forward arguments which reveal a use of the concept of autonomy with much 
clearer parallels to Indigenous uses of the concept of autonomy. The following two 
examples deal with individual autonomy in relation to society, but each in a unique way. 
The first example concerns the rights of individual nations (as autonomous political 
entities). The second example concerns the relationships between individuals in a social 
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context. This second example can also be seen as the problem of balancing individual 
rights against the rights of others. How a People resolve this issue will be reflected in 
their use of such concepts as autonomy. 
Though there are, admittedly, differences in Western and Indigenous uses of the 
concept of autonomy, there seem to be parallels which reflect a fundamental similarity in 
their sometimes divergent uses of this concept. In “Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical 
Sketch” Kant’s use of the concept of autonomy is clarified through its application to 
political matters. In the section entitled ‘No State Shall by force Interfere with the 
Constitution or Government of Another State’ Kant writes; 
interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of an 
independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence it would 
itself be an offense and would render the autonomy of all states 
»89 insecure. 
Kant argues for the autonomy of nations, or states, on the grounds that a “state is 
not.. .a piece of property (patrimonium). It is a society of men whom no one has any right 
to command or to dispose except the state itself.States, in their relations with each 
other, are in a ‘state of nature’; a ‘state’ very similar to the one in which, according to 
Western thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, pre-contact Indigenous peoples lived.^* So, 
having argued for the autonomy of nations, or states, Kant goes on to make the following 
claim regarding the establishment of peace between all nations. 
A state of peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured 
against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; 
Immanuel Kant. “Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical Sketch” in Critique of Practical Reason and Other 
Writings in Moral Philosophy, Trans, and Ed., Lewis White Beck, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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and, unless this security is pledged to each by his neighbor (a thing that 
can occur only in a civil state), each may treat his neighbor, from whom he 
92 demands this security, as an enemy. 
In The Constitution of the Iroquois Nations: The Great Binding Law, 
Gayanashagowa, under article 84, a section entitled ‘Rights and Powers of War’, the 
Iroquois constitution states that “Whenever a foreign nation is conquered or has by their 
own will accepted the Great Peace their own system of internal government may 
continue, but they must cease all warfare against other nations.” Here we see an implicit 
declaration of the autonomy of all nations as well as a striking parallel to Kant’s 
insistence on the autonomy of all nations and their right to govern themselves as they 
choose without interference from other nations. Furthermore, Article 88 of the ‘Rights 
and Powers of War’ deals explicitly with neighbouring nations which fail to assent to 
mutual peace. It reads: 
At the third council the War Chief of the Five nations shall address the 
Chief of the foreign nation and request him three times to accept the Great 
Peace. If refusal steadfastly follows the War Chief shall let the bunch of 
white lake shells drop from his outstretched hand to the ground and shall 
bound quickly forward and club the offending chief to death. War shall 
thereby be declared and the War Chief shall have his warriors at his back 
to meet any emergency. War must continue until the contest is won by the 
Five Nations.^"^ 
Failure by a neighbouring nation to agree to peace seems, in both Indigenous and 
Western cases, to represent a failure to make an explicit acknowledgment of the 
autonomy of nations (as well as individuals). Moreover, a failure to assent to peace 
Kant, “A Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, 311-312. 
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represents a corresponding unwillingness to maintain and protect the autonomy of all 
persons and nations. The political discourse which arises in both of these cultural 
traditions demands the explicit acknowledgment of each other’s autonomy. The reasoning 
behind this demand for peace and security is dealt with by Kant in a footnote he makes 
regarding declaration of war on dissenting nations. Any nation’s or individual’s failure to 
assent (to peace), Kant argues, “deprives me of this security and injures me, if he is near 
me, by this mere status of his even though he does not injure me actively (facto)', he does 
so by the lawlessness of his condition (statu iniusto) which constantly threatens me.”^^ 
Although the Iroquois Constitution makes no direct comment on the reasons for declaring 
war on dissenting nations, I argue that the authors of the Iroquois constitution would 
concur with Kant’s position on the threat such nations pose through their condition of 
lawlessness. 
Robert A. Williams Jr., in Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty 
Visions of Law and Peace, 1600 - 1800, deals extensively with Indigenous legal traditions 
during the colonial period of North American history. Williams’ voice is applicable here 
in that he is not only a Professor of Law and American Indian Studies at the University of 
Arizona, but a member of the Lumbee Indian tribe of North Carolina. A central concern 
in his book is the relevance of Indigenous legal traditions to Indigenous peoples’ 
persistence in arguing that “the world’s tribal peoples are entitled to the same basic 
human rights of cultural survival, autonomy, and self-government recognized as 
belonging to the peoples from Europe who colonized them.”^^ I draw on Williams’ work 
Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, fh. 312. 
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for both his use of the concept of autonomy and his discussion of the Iroquois 
constitution and its placement within the larger context of Indigenous peoples’ struggles 
against the colonizing efforts of Western governments. My specific concern with his 
discussion is with his use “of the Gus-Wen-Tah, the Two Row treaty belt.”^^ The Gus- 
Wen-Tah, Williams argues, “is a part of a long tradition of Iroquois resistance to the 
West’s vision of Indian rights... [and] was presented centuries ago by the Iroquois to the 
Western colonizing nations that first came to North America.” The Iroquois peoples’ 
presentation of the Gus-Wen-Tah to Western peoples reflects one instance of Indigenous 
peoples’ insistence on the relevance of their own traditions to their relations with the 
West. 
Williams’ consideration of the present situation of Indigenous peoples is put 
forward as a response, he says, to the fact that “the emphasis of most scholars who have 
written on the role of law in the relations between Indians and European-derived peoples 
focuses almost exclusively on the story of ‘the white man’s Indian law.’”^^ This story, he 
argues, is one which embodies the attitude that Indigenous peoples’ continued survival 
depends upon rules and principles which are “the exclusive by-products of the Western 
legal tradition brought to America from the Old World.” 
Rather than continue to look at this Western-based view of Indigenous peoples’ 
relations with Western colonial powers, Williams looks, instead, to the ways “American 
Ibid., 4. 




Indians sought [and still seek] to apply their traditions to the problems of achieving law 
and peace on a multicultural frontier."'^* Williams’ argument is that these Indigenous 
traditions contain a vision of law and peace which reflects Indigenous peoples’ notions of 
autonomy and self-government as a framework for establishing relations between 
Indigenous and Western nations. Williams writes: 
In countless treaties, councils, and negotiations, American Indians insisted 
upon the relevance of the principles contained in tribal traditions such as 
the Gus-Wen-Tah for ordering the unique and fractious kind of 
multicultural society that was emerging on the continent. 
The Gus-Wen-Tah provides a symbol for the mutual recognition of friendship and 
equality which the nations of the Iroquois confederacy hoped to establish with Western 
peoples. As a vision of peace between nations, the Gus-Wen-Tah provides another 
valuable source for understanding Indigenous peoples use of the concept of autonomy. In 
regard to the symbolism embodied in this treaty belt, Williams writes: 
In presenting the Gus-Wen-Tah to solemnize their treaties with the 
Western colonial powers, the Iroquois would explain its basic underlying 
vision of law and peace between different peoples as follows: ‘We shall 
each travel the river together, side by side, but in our own boat. Neither of 
us will steer the other’s vessel. 
The integrity and autonomy of individual nations is paramount in this vision of 
law and peace. We see in this quotation, as well as in the Iroquois constitution itself, a 
notion of autonomy which emphasizes not only the individual autonomy of nations, but 
also an acknowledgment that treatied nations shall each travel the river together. We see 




here an acknowledgment that regardless of our individuality we share a fundamental 
connection: we make this journey together. Williams writes: 
According to American Indian multicultural constitutionalism, different 
peoples in a relationship of close connection were expected to embrace the 
sacredly revealed truth of their shared humanity as a basis of normative 
action toward each other....They imagined themselves as obligated to 
sustain a constitutional tradition of human solidarity with each other. 
These values, customs, and traditions reflected a basic paradigm of 
American Indian visions of law and peace: as human beings in a world of 
diversity and conflict, we are under an obligation to link arms together 
In terms of Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments, we see here the various metaphorical 
structurings of a peoples’ understanding of a particular concept, in this case, the concept 
of autonomy. The metaphors of traveling the river together, not steering the other’s 
vessel, and linking arms together, provide a framework for understanding how Indigenous 
peoples are using the concept of autonomy, as well as an insight into their unique ways of 
reasoning. A holistic understanding of Indigenous peoples’ use of the concept of 
autonomy requires that we look at these metaphors not one at a time (in isolation from 
each other), but rather at the cumulative effect of their meanings. In their book Metaphors 
We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson argue: 
a metaphor works when it satisfies a purpose, namely, understanding an 
aspect of... [a] concept. When two metaphors successfully satisfy two 
purposes, then overlaps in purposes will correspond to overlaps in the 
metaphors. Such overlaps, we claim, can be characterized in terms of 
shared metaphorical entailments and the cross-metaphorical 
correspondences established by them.*^^ 
Each of these above mentioned metaphors reflects only one particular aspect of 
the concept of autonomy. Individually, each of these metaphors can show us only part of 
Ibid., 123. The italics are my own. 
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 97. The 
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the picture, and so, it is only through considering their cumulative effect that we can 
reach a more complete understanding of Indigenous peoples’ use of the concept of 
autonomy, an understanding of what Indigenous peoples mean, or have in mind, in their 
use of the Western word ‘autonomy’. 
First, there is the metaphor of traveling the river together, side by side. Embodied 
in this metaphor is an attitude, or vision, of working at joint purposes, as opposed to 
working at cross-purposes. We also see in this metaphor an attitude of independence, in 
that although we travel the same river together we do this side by side, as opposed to 
traveling the river, as it were, in the same vessel. Furthermore, there is, in this metaphor, 
an acknowledgment of the equality of each of the parties involved. We see here a 
situation where one party does not lead the other parties involved, each travels by the 
other’s side. 
Secondly, the metaphor of not steering the other’s vessel seems to carry with it an 
acknowledgment that each party shall not only be viewed as independent, but that each 
party shall at all times be allowed to make decisions of their own accord. Each party 
maintains their individual integrity. 
Coupled with these metaphors which arise in the Gus-Wen-Tah, there is also the 
important metaphor of linking arms together. There is not only a recognition of the 
equality and independence of each of the parties involved, but also an acknowledgment of 
the need to establish, or develop, a sense of solidarity. This solidarity serves not only to 
foster a sense of affinity between the parties involved, to help and protect each other, but 
does so while recognizing differences. This solidarity should not, however, be understood 
in terms of a sense of nationalism. Rather, it is a solidarity in the pursuit of peace and 
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friendship between parties, or nations, with differing traditions (differences which in 
some cases led to war). Williams argues: 
That is why, in Indian diplomacy, a treaty was told as a special kind of 
story, a way of imagining a world of human solidarity where we regard 
others as our relatives.... For Indians of the Encounter era, a treaty, told 
and retold as a story over time, was envisioned as a part of a constitutional 
tradition of law and peace achieved between different peoples in a hostile 
and chaotic world.... Through this tradition, the Iroquois fulfilled the 
lawgiver Deganwidah's sacred command issued at the founding of their 
ancient confederacy: to make the Tree of Peace prevail. 
The vision of law and peace which is contained in the Great Peace embraced by 
the Iroquois is one which Kant might very well have had in mind when he declared: “A 
state of peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured against hostility it 
is not sufficient that hostilities simply must not be committed.”*^^ It is not enough that 
hostilities simply not be present, the establishment of peace must be actively sought. So, 
although Indigenous and Western traditions diverge in certain aspects of their use of the 
concept of autonomy, such as Indigenous peoples’ inclusion of other-than-human beings 
into the moral community, the similarities in usage here seem to indicate the possibility of 
different cultures arriving at notions of autonomy which overlap significantly, thus 
providing the opportunity of rendering their respective worldviews mutually intelligible. 
Autonomy, the Individual in Society, and Religious Attitudes 
In Freedom and Culture, Dorothy Lee presents an insightful discussion which 
deals with the concept of autonomy in its connection with Native peoples’ view of the 
individual’s role in the context of a society, as well as its connection with religious 
Williams, Linking Arms Together, 113-114. 
Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, 311-114. 
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matters. Throughout her book she makes reference to a variety of Indigenous cultures, but 
she also presents “a brief sketch of the culture of the Navaho Indians, to show how the 
1 08 
principle of autonomy is supported by a cultural framework.” 
Lee is well aware that we are all equally faced with the problem of trying “to 
decide how much our principle of personal autonomy involves. We find ourselves asking 
such questions as: to what extent can we allow a child to make its own decisions.”In 
other words, we must decide, in a sense, how we are going to use the concept of 
autonomy. Lee notes that there are many drastically different systems of social order and 
each of these must deal with this concept in its own particular way. For example, in 
contrast to a position where one must decide how much autonomy to allow a child, Lee 
argues that “for many of the societies we know, it would be [a] presumption for any 
person to ‘allow’ another to take what is essentially his prerogative - the right to decide 
for himself.”"" 
Lee notes that in some Native societies we find “a conception of individual 
autonomy and democratic procedures which far outstrip anything we [Western people] 
have practiced or even have conceived of as democracy.”*'' This notion of autonomy, she 
thinks, can be seen in the various patterns of social behavior of North American 
Indigenous peoples. As I mentioned in Chapter One, McPherson (an Ojibwa scholar) also 
argues that there is “a fundamental difference in the perspectives and cultural practices of 
Lee, Freedom and Culture, 5. 
Ibid., 6. 
Ibid., 6. The addition in square brackets is my own. 
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Europeans and Aboriginals.”^ In light of these differences, McPherson puts forward the 
following warning: 
One must be careful... not to confuse the concept of the individual with 
that of autonomy or vise-versa. Nor should one even consider the two 
terms to be in any way synonymous. The concept of individual rights, 
along with concomitant strict, legalistic regulation of individual behaviour, 
are foreign to most Aboriginal traditions.’ 
In the case of the Navaho, Lee argues that there exists not only a social structure 
based on “a tightly knit group, depending on mutual responsibility among ail its 
members, a precisely structured universe””"^ but there is also “great respect for individual 
autonomy and integrity.””^ The kind of radical use of this concept which Lee has in mind 
is in its connection with children. She notes, as I have as well through previous examples, 
that the degree to which Indigenous peoples recognize children as being autonomous 
would to most people in Western mainstream society seem extreme. The crucial point 
which Lee wants to make is that this use of individual autonomy has to do with the 
cultural framework in which it is being used, in this case, the Navaho culture.”^ Lee 
describes Navaho society, in part, as one in which 
Adults and children are valued for their sheer being, just because they are. 
There is no urge toward achievement; no one has to strive for success. In 
fact, neither is there reward for success, nor is success held out as a reward 
for hard work. Wealth may be the result of hard work and skill, but...[n]o 
good Navaho becomes and remains “wealthy” in our [Western] terms. 
Dennis McPherson. “A Definition of Culture” Native American Religious Identity: Unforgotten Gods, 
Jace Weaver, Ed., (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1998), 92. 
Ibid., 92. 
Lee, Freedom and Culture, 10. 
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Self-interest is viewed as being destructive to the integrity of the social whole. 
Each member of Navaho society comprises a part of the whole in a way no less important 
than any other member's part in the whole order of Navaho society. What follows from 
this, Lee argues, is that ”the individual remains inviolate. No one coerces another among 
the Navaho.” Autonomy is granted equally to all members of Navaho society. Lee 
notes that, in Navaho society, children are not forced to ‘go to bed’ at certain times, a 
situation which holds true of most Indigenous societies. Brundige documents the 
principle of non-interference in Mohawk, Cree and Ojibwa societies and makes the claim 
that the “last thing the Native people at the point of contact would have used on their 
children was ‘the rod of discipline’.”^Moreover, Lee argues that an individual in 
Navaho society is not directly told by others how he or she is and is not supposed to 
contribute to the group as a whole. In pointing to these aspects of Navaho society, Lee has 
“tried to show that law and limits and personal autonomy can co-exist effectively, that 
spontaneity is not necessarily killed by group responsibility.”'^^ 
Lee also wants to argue that the religious views of the Navaho have played a 
crucial role in achieving this delicate balance between social order (laws or traditional 
patterns of social behaviour) and individual autonomy. Unlike Western mainstream 
society where people generally “identify six days with the secular in life and only the 
^'^Ibid., 12. 
Brundige, “Continuity of Native Values: Cree and Ojibwa”, 49. 
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1 9 1 seventh with religion,” in societies such as that of the Navaho, “religion is rarely absent 
from the details of everyday living.”'"^ Even though religious attitudes are intricately 
woven into the Navahos overall social framework, Lee argues that “it is doubtful that 
1 9^ religion as such has a name; Kluckhom reports that the Navaho have no such word.” 
Religious attitudes and practices are not reserved for special occasions, e.g., Sunday 
church services. In other words, there is not the same kind of separation between religious 
and secular activities as there is in Western society. 
Lee illustrates the unity of religious attitudes and secular activities in referring to 
the agricultural activities of the Navaho. She writes that, “[w]hen the Navaho planted his 
com sunwise [moving with the sun from east to west], his act reflected a total worldview, 
and it would be nonsense for us [Western observers trying to understand such activities] 
to separate the planting itself from the direction of the planting.”Similarly, it makes 
just as little sense when attempting to understand the daily lives, or daily activities, of 
Indigenous peoples to separate the strictly secular from the strictly sacred. The carrying 
out of social activities, and the particular relationships between individuals in Navaho 
society are both, Lee argues, “a continuous part of a total activity.”The same can be 
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Although the Indigenous societies of North America, in general, the Navaho 
included, might not refer to the religious attitudes which pervade their social order as a 
religion, they do, indeed, acknowledge a relationship between the individual and the 
spiritual dimension of life. Lee refers to such North American Indigenous spiritual terms 
as yapaitu, manitou, and wakan (the latter being central to the phrase ‘Wakanyan hotan’ 
which Meyer and Ramirez’s discuss). Importantly, she also argues that 
this is what they reach through faith, the other end of the relationship; the 
relationship itself is unnamed. Apparently, to behave and think religiously, 
is to behave and think. To describe a way of life in its totality is to describe 
a religious way of life. 
It is this connection between individual autonomy, society, and religious attitudes 
which I am interested in exploring in Kant’s work in order to show parallels which 
Indigenous scholars, such as Brundige and McPherson, have missed. Admittedly, 
Western mainstream society seems to hold an essentially Kantian view of individual 
autonomy which stresses balancing individual rights against the rights of others in secular 
activities. However, many other influences have shaped the use of the concept of 
autonomy in Western society. Brundige argues that it is also religious attitudes, such as 
those stemming from the Old Testament, which shaped the Western notion of autonomy, 
and, in part, led to traditional Western attitudes such as that “parents have a God-given 
right or duty to disciple their children, whether physically or verbally.Such religious 
beliefs (implicit in English common law) have also been relied on for sanctioning the use, 
in Western society, of such inventive systems of disciple as the ‘rule of thumb’, in the 
Lee, Freedom and Culture, 165. 
Brundige, “Continuity of Native Values: Cree and Ojibwa”, 49. 
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sense that it was acceptable for a man to beat his wife so long as the object was no larger 
than the circumference of his thumb. 
My point in all of this is that Kant’s own particular view on individual autonomy 
is not necessarily one which is used in everyday social interactions in Western society, 
though I do admit that the prevailing social attitude did have an influence on Kant’s 
articulation of the concept of autonomy. Kant’s arguments concerning both the concept of 
autonomy and political and social matters are, at best ideals, ideals which, to some 
people, might seem both austere and extreme. In his essay, “What is Enlightenment?”, 
Kant makes a few remarks regarding the connections between individual autonomy, 
society, and religious matters. Kant writes: 
I have placed the main point of enlightenment - the escape of men from 
their self-incurred tutelage - chiefly in matters of religion because our 
leaders have no interest in playing the guardian with respect to the arts and 
sciences and also because religious immaturity is not only the most 
1 "^0 
harmful but also the most degrading of all. 
It seems that for Kant there is a connection between autonomy and religious, or 
spiritual, matters. This sense of religious maturity is to be present in not only religious 
activities, it is a religious attitude which ought to be present in all our daily activities. 
Developing this religious attitude is the responsibility of the individual, and it is not, in 
Kant’s view, something which ought to be legislated. In a similar way, Lee argues: “The 
specific formulation differed in the different tribes [of the Indians of the Plains], but, 
essentially, in all it was believed that each individual and particularly each man, must tap 
For further discussion, see: Jennifer Baker Fleming. Stopping Wife Abuse: A Guide to the Emotional, 
Psychological, and Legal Implications... for the Abused Woman and Those Helping Her (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Books, 1979), 270. 
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 89. 
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this universal force if his undertakings were to be successful.... The relationship with the 
divine, in... [the case of the Sioux], is personal and intense.... Each man, each pre- 
adolescent boy, had to achieve the relationship for himself”’^’ The parallels between 
Kant’s views on enlightenment and Native attitudes such as those of the Sioux are 
striking. For both Kant and the Sioux this sense of religious maturity is required for, as 
Lee says, “enhancing and intensifying the being of the man who acted.” It is this sort of 
religious attitude which ought to serve as an aid in guiding the individual in his or her 
relations with others. 
Kant’s view of the relationship between individual autonomy and social relations 
seems to be something like the following. A good society ought to allow its members the 
freedom to live together in good conscience. It allows its members to develop their talents 
on their own accord. Good society seems to result when individuals contribute to the 
whole in their own way. In Kant’s ‘kingdom of ends’ this result is achieved only when 
universal law is applied by each member. In regard to the point Kant is trying to make 
about the individual’s role in society, he writes: “It is the freedom to make public use of 
one’s reason at every point. But I hear on all sides, ‘Do not argue!’ The officer says: ‘Do 
not argue but drill!’ the tax collector: ‘Do not argue but pay!’... Everywhere there is 
restriction on freedom.”*^^ Kant seems to be expressing a fundamental dissatisfaction 
with his own society. 
Lee, Freedom and Culture, 173. The additions in square brackets are my own. 
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So, it seems to follow from Kant’s remarks that good society arises when each 
member understands for himself the need both, 1) to maintain his integrity as an 
individual, and 2) to contribute to the whole while remembering, at all times, to 
acknowledge and preserve the autonomy of others. Or, in Kantian terms, good society 
arises when its members have awakened to one of the touchstone principles of his moral 
theory: the categorical imperative. In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
writes: 
The practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you would 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as 
a end and never as a means only... For all rational beings stand under the 
law that each of them should treat himself and others never merely as 
means, but in every case at the same time as an end in himself. Thus there 
arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective 
laws. This is a realm which may be called a realm of ends (certainly only 
an ideal) because what these laws have in view is just the relation of these 
beings to each other as ends and means. 
A sense of moral conscience, or religious maturity should be present when we 
conduct our daily, or secular, affairs, and should pervade our whole life and all of our 
social interactions. It is a sense of religious or spiritual maturity which has long been 
embraced by North American Indigenous peoples. Admittedly, Kant’s referring to this 
realm as merely an ideal does seem consistent with his expressed dissatisfaction with the 
culture in which he participated as a member. Nevertheless, Kant’s remarks contain 
striking parallels to the attitudes of Indigenous peoples. For Kant, too, it seems as though 
the truly autonomous man is at the same time a religious man. 
Though a demonstration of the mutual intelligibility of Western and Indigenous 
use of concepts, such as autonomy, might very well be carried out in various ways, in this 
134 Ibid., 46 and 50. 
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Study, I have been concentrating on one such possible way. In contrast to the efforts of 
16-17^^ century Western philosophers to see the world as the passive object of scientific 
investigation, we now recognize, through the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Abram, that such a picture of the world is itself merely a philosophical construct. We see 
now that there is a common lifeworld which underlies all our views on this world, 
scientific or otherwise. The result of this fundamental shift in Western philosophical 
thought has been that it is easier for those who hold a phenomenological perspective to 
appreciate the possibility of there being mutual intelligibility between such different 
perspectives as those we find in Western and Indigenous traditions. 
In this study, we have begun to see that it is possible to develop not only an 
understanding of how and why Indigenous peoples are using the English word 
‘autonomy’, but an appreciation of the perspectives which have served in shaping their 
Indigenous employment of this concept. Seeing, now, that it is possible to develop such 
an understanding, we must continue to do so if we are to bring an end to the persistent 
conflict, conceptual and otherwise, which exists between Native and non-Native peoples 
here in North America. Only then can we begin to move from mere tolerance to 
understanding, and finally come to see the full significance of Charles Johnson’s claim 
that, despite our differences, “when it comes down to the crunch, we share, all of us, the 
11 s same cultural lifeworld.” 
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